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INTRODUCTION

This Article makes a very specific and concrete proposal: it argues
that courts should adjust the scope of copyright protection to account
for the passage of time by expressly considering time as a factor in fair
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use analysis.1 More specifically, this Article argues that the older a
copyrighted work is, the greater the scope of fair use should be - that
is, the greater the ability of others to re-use, critique, transform, and
adapt the copyrighted work without permission of the copyright
owner. Conversely, the newer the work, the narrower the scope of fair
use. Or, even more concretely, this Article argues that fair use should
be greater for Mickey Mouse2 than for Harry Potter.3
Up to now, most of the debate over the role of time in copyright
law has focused on copyright duration and the controversial issue of
copyright term extension.4 Since passage of the first Copyright Act in
1790, Congress has dramatically extended the copyright term from an
original maximum term of twenty-eight years to the current term of
seventy years after the death of the author.5 Congress's most recent
extension of the term in 19986 touched off a fierce debate over both
the propriety and constitutionality of this extension. Those supporting
the extension have argued, inter alia, that a longer term encourages
creative activity, that it is necessary to provide incentives to preserve
copyrighted works in the digital age, and that it is necessary to harmo
nize our copyright laws with those of other countries.7 Those opposing
1. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) ("[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an in
fringement of copyright.").
2. Mickey Mouse first appeared in 1928 in a short animated film, under the name
Steamboat Willie. See STEAMBOAT WILLIE (Walt Disney 1 928).
3. See J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE SORCERER'S STONE (1998).
4. See, e.g., Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. granted sub nom. Eldred
v. Ashcroft, 122 S.Ct. 1062 (2002); ROBERT L. BARD & LEWIS KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT
DURATION: DURATION, TERM EXTENSION, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND THE MAKING OF
COPYRIGHT POLICY (1999) [hereinafter BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION];
Robert L. Bard & Lewis Kurlantzick, Copyright Duration at the Millennium, 47 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 13 (2000) [hereinafter Bard & Kurlantzick, Millennium]; Hon.
Hank Brown & David Miller, Copyright Term Extension: Sapping American Creativity, 44 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 94 (1996); Lisa M. Brownlee, Recent Changes in the Duration of
Copyright in the United States and European Union: Procedure and Policy, 6 FORDHAM
lNTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 579 (1996); Shauna C. Bryce, Life Plus Seventy: The Ex
tension of Copyright Terms in the European Union and Proposed Legislation in the United
States, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 525 (1996); Marci A. Hamilton, Copyright Duration Extension
and the Dark Heart of Copyright, 1 4 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 655 (1996); Peter Jaszi,
Caught in the Net of Copyright, 75 OR. L. REV. 299 (1996); William F. Patry, The Copyright
Term Extension Act of 1995: Or How Publishers Managed to Steal the Bread From Authors,
1 4 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 661 (1996); J.H. Reichman, The Duration of Copyright and
the Limits of Cultural Policy, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 625 (1996); Jenny L. Dixon,
Note, The Copyright Term Extension Act: ls Life Plus Seventy Too Much?, 18 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 945 (1996); Joseph A. Lavigne, Comment, For Limited Times? Making
Rich Kids Richer Via the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1996, 73 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
311 (1996).
5. See 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 4.7, at 4:138 (Supp. 2001).
6. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 1 05-298, 112 Stat. 2827
(1998), amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-04. ·
7. See, e.g., Hon. Howard Coble, Recent Developments in Intellectual Property, 22
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 269, 296 (1998); Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, Toward a Principled Ap-

November 2002]

Copyright and Time

411

the extension have argued that it effectively provides no additional in
centive for creative activity,8 that it harms the public by depriving it of
free access to works, and that it may well be unconstitutional.9
By focusing so narrowly on the end of the copyright term, how
ever, this debate has neglected the-Significant issue of how time should
affect the scope of copyright protection during the copyright term.
That is, whether or not the most recent extension is j ustified or consti
tutional, the fact remains that the copyright term is extremely long.
Until now, courts and commentators have generally assumed that the
scope of protection during this long term is constant or unaffected, at
least directly, by the passage of time. Perhaps this assumption made
sense when the copyright term was a short twenty-eight years, but
does it still hold when the term of protection can span an entire cen
tury? Are the policies and justifications underlying copyright law
really unaltered by the passage of time? What implications might
there be for the appropriate scope of copyright protection? Up to
now, these questions have been left largely unaddressed.
In this Article, I will argue that extremely strong justifications exist
for considering time expressly in setting the scope of copyright protec
tion, and that fair use provides an ideal vehicle, both doctrinally and
theoretically, for such consideration.10 Indeed, an examination of the
proach to Copyright Legislation at the Turn of the Millennium, 59 U. PITI. L. REV. 719, 736
(1998); Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Term Extension: Boon for the American Creators and the
American Economy, 45 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 319, 325 (1997). See infra Section I.A
for a fuller articulation of these arguments.
8. See, e.g., A Bill to Amend Title 17, United States Code With Respect to the Duration
of Copyright, and for Other Purposes: Hearing on H.R. 989 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995)
(written testimony of Dennis S. Karjala representing United States copyright and intellectual
property law professors), available at http://www.law.asu.edu/HomePages/Karjala/
OpposingCopyrightExtension/legmats/writtest.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2002); Hearing on
S. 483 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995) (oral testimony of Peter
Jaszi, Professor of Law, American University), available at http://www.law.asu.edu/
HomePages/Karjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/legmats/jazsi95.html (last visited Nov. 10,
2002); BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4. See infra Section I.A
for a fuller articulation of these arguments.
9. See, e.g., Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power:
The Intellectual Property Clause as an A bsolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV.
1 1 19 (concluding that the term extension likely exceeded implied limits on Congressional
authority imposed by the Copyright Clause); Lawrence Lessig, Copyright's First Amend
ment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057 (2001); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within
the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001) (applying intermediate First
Amendment scrutiny to term extension and finding that term extension fails). For a more
comprehensive list of articles on the constitutionality of the term extension, see infra note
90.
10. A more limited version of this proposal has been advanced in Note, Gone With the
Wind Done Gone: "Re-Writing" and Fair Use, 1 15 HARV. L. REV. 1193 (2002). In that Note,
the author analyzes the specific problem of "re-writing" of existing creative works and sug
gests that courts, inter alia, take into account the age of the work when deciding such cases.
See id. at 1211 n.115 ("The proposal put forth here is limited to re-writings . . . . ) In this
Article, I advance the broader claim that courts should consider time as part of fair use
"

.
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theoretical justifications· underlying copyright law reveals that the
strength and impact of these justifications are quite directly affected
by the passage of time. As I will show, over the course of the copyright
term, the impact of protection on copyright incentives wanes, as does
an author's moral claim to the fruits of his or her labor. At the same
time, the societal interest in ensuring widespread access to works and
in encouraging re.-use and adaptation of copyrighted works increases.
By considering time in fair use analysis, courts can adjust the scope of
copyright protection to respond more dynamically to these changes in
copyright interests over the length of the copyright term.
Furthermore; such a result could be achieved quite easily within
existing copyright case law. Unlike constitutional challenges to term
extension,11 this result would not require courts to stretch the doctrine
or strike down any statutes. Indeed, existing doctrine provides ample
support for consideration of time as a factor in fair use analysis. The
Copyright Act and its legislative history expressly authorize courts to
consider additional factors in fair use analysis, and courts have used
this authorization to consider a wide range of additional factors not
expressly mentioned in the statute.12 Given the strong theoretical ar
guments for considering time, courts should feel quite comfortable in
corporating this inquiry into fair use analysis. Consideration of time
would thus be a modest doctrinal change that could have significant
benefits.
Finally, the proposal advanced in this Article would provide courts
with a legitimate way to inject much-needed public-regarding values
into the scope of copyright protection. One of the concerns underlying
the debate over copyright term extension is the extent to which this
extension, like all prior extensions, resulted from a structural imbal
ance in lobbying power.13 While the benefits of term extension accrue
to a few, highly-focused and well-organized interests, the costs of ex
tension, though significant in the aggregate, are more widely distrib
uted among the population at large. Term extensions are thus difficult
to oppose, as public choice theory predicts. Indeed, this imbalance has
been reflected not only in the struggle over term extension, but also in
analysis generally, and seek to ground this broader claim more comprehensively in existing
copyright theory.
Justin Hughes also advances a similar proposal in a forthcoming article. Justin Hughes,
Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2003) [hereinafter Hughes, Fair Use].
Although the broad outline of Hughes's proposal is similar to the one !idvanced in this
Article (in that both call for some consideration of time in fair use analysis), the theoretical
justifications for Hughes's proposal and the specifics of its implementation are quite differ
ent. Id.
11. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. granted sub nom. Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 122 S.Ct. 1062 (2002).
12 See infra Section III.A.
13. See infra Section 11.D.
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other Congressional expansions of copyright protection. For those
concerned about this structural imbalance, this Article provides a
mechanism for courts to legitimately incorporate public-regarding val
ues into the scope of copyright protection. Even for those who are not
concerned, however, the general policy justifications underlying copy
right law provide strong support for this proposal.
The rest of this Article explains the proposal in more detail and
builds the case in support of it. Part I provides the context for the pro
posal, describing the debate over term extension and the arguments on
both sides of the issue. It then briefly sketches out the proposal and
explains how it relates to this wider debate. Part II then examines the
theoretical argument in support of the proposal, concluding that it
finds extremely strong support under several different theories un
derlying copyright law. I start with the policy arguments, rather than
the doctrine, because these arguments provide the impetus for the
proposal. Part III then builds the doctrinal case for the proposal, ex
amining the doctrine, case law, and legislative history for support. The
conclusion I reach is that the copyright act clearly authorizes courts to
consider time in their fair use analysis, and that, given the strong pol
icy reasons supporting such a consideration, they should do so. Part IV
then returns to the proposal and fleshes it out by applying it to a num
ber of examples and showing how the proposal would have many con
crete benefits. Part IV concludes by addressing a number of antici
pated objections.
I.
A.

TH EPROPOSAL IN CONTEXT
The Debate over Term Extension

For the next sixteen years, not a single, published, copyrighted
work in the United States will pass into the public domain. That is,
from now until December 31, 2018,14 not one published, copyrighted
work will have its term of copyright protection expire.15 This is be
cause Congress passed the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act16 in 1998, extending the term of copyright protection by an addi
tional twenty years. For works authored by individuals, the term now
extends until seventy years after the death of the author;17 for works
14. On this date, works that were copyrighted in 1923 will pass into the public domain.
The Copyright Act provides that works whose terms would technically expire during the
year retain copyrighted status until the end of that calendar year. 17 U.S.C. § 305 (2000).
15. Note the qualification "published." Certain previously unpublished works, which
were brought under copyright protection under § 303 of the 1976 Act, will enter the public
domain on January 1, 2003, unless they are published before that date, in which case they
will be protected until 2047. See § 303(a).
16. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998), amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-04.
17. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000).
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"authored" by corporate entities,18 the term is now ninety-five years
from the date of publication or 120 years after creation, whichever ex
pires first.19 Not only does this apply to future works, but Congress
also made this extension retroactive, applying it to all existing works
still under copyright protection at the time the extension went into ef
fect.20 As a result of this retroactive extension, no published works will
pass into the public domain for twenty years after the Act went into
effect.
The impact of this extension on copyright markets is significant.
Until passage of the extension, copyrighted works had been passing
into the public domain at a steady pace. In 1998, for example, T.S.
Eliot's The Waste Land,21 James Joyce's Ulysses,22 and the movie
Blood and Sand23 with Rudolph Valentino all passed into the public
domain.24 In 1996 and 1997, F. Scott Fitzgerald's This Side of
Paradise,25 D.H. Lawrence's Women in Love,26 Edith Wharton's The
Age ofInnocence,27 and the song Over There by George M. Cohan28 all
passed into the public domain.29 What this meant was that these works
could now be freely copied, distributed, and built upon by others. So if
you wanted to print and sell copies of The Waste Land, you could
freely do so without seeking a license from, or paying a royalty to, the
copyright owner. Similarly, if you wanted to write and sell your own
sequel of This Side of Paradise, or make a movie out of The Age of
Innocence, you could do so. All of these uses were now freely permit
ted once the term of copyright protection ended.

18. Or, more precisely, works "made for hire"; the Copyright statute considers the em
ployer to be the "author" of works made by an employee or independent contractor under
some circumstances. See § 302(c). Anonymous and pseudonymous works also share this
same term. Id.
·

19. Id.
20. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998), amending 17 U.S.C. § 302-304.
21. T.S. ELIOT, THE WASTE LAND (1922).
22. JAMES JOYCE, ULYSSES (1922). But see Robert Spoo, Note, Copyright Protectionism
and Its Discontents: The Case ofJames Joyce's Ulysses in America, 108 YALE L.J. 633 (1998)
(suggesting that Ulysses in fact passed into the public domain long ago as a result of failure
to comply with certain requirements).
23. BLOOD AND SAND (1922).
24. These examples and many others can be found at Dennis Karjala's excellent web
site, Opposing Copyright Extension, at http://www.law.asu.edu/HomePages/Karjala/
OpposingCopyrightExtension (last visited June 6, 2002) [hereinafter Karjala, Website].
25. F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THIS SIDE OF PARADISE (1920).
26. 0.H. LAWRENCE, WOMEN IN LOVE (1920).
27. EDITH WHARTON, THE AGE OF INNOCENCE (1920).
28. George M. Cohan, Over There (1920).
29. See Karjala, supra note 24.
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The fact that these works passed into the public domain was no ac
cident. Rather, it was an essential part' of the design of copyright law.30
The basic idea behind copyright law is that an author gets a certain
number of years during which he or she can prevent unauthorized
copying and distribution of the creative work. This exclusive period
permits the copyright owner to exploit the work and obtain a return
for his or her creative labor, thus providing ·an incentive to engage in
the labor in the first place. This period of exclusive control is limited,
however. The Constitution expressly authorizes copyright protection
only for "limited Times,"31 and the Copyright Act places precisely such
a limit on the duration of copyright.32 The idea behind the limited
grant is that, after an author has been sufficiently compensated33 for
his or her creative labor, the work should pass into the public domain
so that all of society can use it freely, so that it can be disseminated
more broadly, and so that its expressive elements can be appropriated
and built upon.34 This reflects the balance struck by copyright law be
tween providing incentives for creation and promoting wide dissemi
nation of the fruits of this creation.
Because of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,35
however, many copyrighted works that were scheduled to pass into the
public domain in the years from 1998 through 2018 will now remain
copyrighted for an additional twenty years. Among these works are
Disney's original Mickey Mouse36 (originally scheduled to expire in
30. See, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990) ("The copyright term is limited
so that the public will not be permanently deprived of the fruits of an artist's labors."); Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) ("[Copyright] is intended to
motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward,
and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of ex
clusive control has expired."); David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LA w &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1981, at 147, 171; Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39
EMORY L.J. 965 (1990).
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8 (granting Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the ex
clusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries"); see also Melville B. Nimmer,
Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17
UCLA L. REV. 1 180, 1193 (1970).
32. 17 u.s.c. § 302 (2000) .
33. Not surprisingly, there is much difference of opinion over what is "sufficient." See
infra Section II.A.
34. See Litman, Public Domain, supra note 30; David Nimmer, The End of Copyright,
48 VAND. L. REV. 1385, 1416 (1995) ("[W]orks are relegated to the public domain to be
come the heritage of all humanity and copyright is simply a temporary way station to reward
authors on the road to that greater good.").
35. See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the "Digital Millennium, "
23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 137, 170 (1999).
36. See STEAMBOAT WILLIE (Walt Disney 1928). Pluto would have gone into the public
domain in 2006, and Goofy in 2008. Similarly, the copyright in A.A. Milne's Winnie the
Pooh, which Disney had just recently acquired, was also scheduled to fall into the public
domain. See Jon Garon, Media & Monopoly in the Information Age: Slowing the Conver-
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2003),37 George Gershwin's Rhapsody in Blue (originally scheduled to
expire in 1999),38 numerous works by Cole Porter, Irving Berlin,
Hoagy Carmichael, Ernest Hemingway, and William Faulkner,39 as
well as thousands of other books, articles, movies, songs, photographs,
and artworks from the artistically productive 1920s and 30s.40 The
owners of these copyrights will now be able to license and receive
revenue from those copyrights for an additional twenty years. The
public, conversely, will now have to wait an additional twenty years for
these and all other works still under copyright to pass into the public
domain.
This extension was merely the latest in a long line of congressional
extensions of the copyright term. The term of protection under the
original 1790 Act was fourteen years, with the possibility of renewal
for another fourteen-year term, resulting in a potential total of twenty
eight years.41 The maximum possible term was lengthened in 1831 to
forty-two years,42 then in 1909 to fifty-six years.43 And then, beginning
in 1962, Congress embarked on a steady course of incremental exten
sions - nine separate times within twelve years44 - which expanded
the maximum term from fifty-six to seventy years for subsisting

gence at the Marketplace of Ideas, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 491, 523 (1999); Hannibal
Travis, Comment, Pirates of the Information Infrastructure: Blackstonian Copyright and the
First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L:J. 777, 828 (2000).
37. See Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey Mouse Effort, CHI. TRIB.,
Oct. 17, 1998, at 22.
38. See John Solomon, Rhapsody in Green, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 3, 1999, at E2; Dennis
Karjala, Value of the Public Domain, at http://www.law.asu.edu/HomePages/Karjala/
OpposingCopyrightExtension/publicdomain/Pdlist.html (last visited June 6, 2002).
39. See Karjala, supra note 38; Teresa Ou, From Wheaton v. Peters to Eldred v. Reno:
An Originalist Interpretation of the Copyright Clause, at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/
eldredvreno/OuEldred.pdf (last visited June 6, 2002).
40. See Carl S. Kaplan, Free Book Sites Hurt by Copyright Law, N.Y. TIMES ON THE
WEB, Oct. 30, 1998, at http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/98/10/cyber/cyberlaw/30law.html
(last visited June 6, 2002) (quoting Michael Hart, director of the Gutenberg Project, esti
mating that the extension "will essentially prevent about one million books from entering
the public domain over the next 20 years."); see also Richard A. Epstein, Congress's Copy
right Giveaway, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 1998, at A19; E. Scott Johnson, Law Gives Copyrights
New Life, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 8, 1999, at Cl2 (listing works that would have gone into the pub
lic domain, but for the extension); Joyce Slaton, A Mickey Mouse Copyright Law?, WIRED,
Jan. 13, 1999, available at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,17327,00.html.
41. See Copyright Act of 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (1790); 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 4.7,
at 4:138.
42. See Act of Feb. 3, 1831, §§ 1-2, 4 Stat. 436, 436-37 (1831).
43. See Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 23 (1909) (repealed 1978).
44. Pub. L. No. 87-668 (1962) (59 years); Pub. L. No. 89-142 (1965) (61 years); Pub. L.
No. 90-141 (1967) (62 years); Pub. L. No. 90-416 (1968) (63 years); Pub. L. No. 91-147 (1969)
(64 years); Pub. L. No. 91-555 (1970) (65 years); Pub. L. No. 92-170 (1971) (66 years); Pub. L.
No. 92-566 (1972) (68 years); Pub. L. No. 93-573 (1974) (70 years).
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works.45 In the substantial revision of the Act in 1976, Congress ex
tended the maximum possible term for existing works to seventy-five
years.46 For future works, a new way of calculating the term replaced
the prior fixed term: all future works would be protected for the life of
the author plus fifty years.47 This change in the calculation of the term
resulted in a dramatic extension of the copyright term.48 For example,
a work created by an author in his thirties would have a copyright
term of more than ninety years from publication, if the author lived to
at least seventy. Finally, the latest extension occurred in 1998, when
Congress passed the Bono Act and extended the copyright term to the
life of the author plus seventy years.49
Many of these extensions50 came under heavy attack from various
academics and public interest groups, and the Bono Act was no excep
tion.51 With respect to the extension for future works, commentators
pointed out that any additional revenue created by an additional
twenty years of protection more than fifty years after the death of the
author was unlikely to lead to any appreciable increase in creative ef
fort or activity, given the long period of time over which any revenues
would have to be discounted.52 And even if some minimal degree of
45. These extensions were made in anticipation of the substantial 1976 revision of the
Act.
46. Pub. L. No. 94-553 (1976) (75 years) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 304 (1994)).

47. 17 u.s.c. § 302 (1994).
48. See generally Tom W. Bell, Escape from Copyright: Market Success vs. Statutory
Failure in the Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 781 (2001).
49. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998), amending 17 U.S.C. § 302-304.
SO. See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HA RV. L. REV. 281, 323 (1970) (detailing the
doubtful case for extension of the pre-1976 Act term); Ralph S. Brown, Copyright and Its
Upstart Cousins: Privacy, Publicity, Unfair Competition, 33 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 301,
302 (1986).

51. See generally Statement of Copyright and Intellectual Property Law Professors
in Opposition to H.R. 604, H.R. 2589, and S. 505 Submitted to the Committees on the
Judiciary, U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives, 105th Cong. {1998) (written
testimony of Dennis Karjala), available at http://www.law.asu.edu/HomePages/Karjala/
OpposingCopyrightExtensionllegmats/1998Statement.html (last visited July 25, 2002)
(hereinafter Karjala, Statement]; Bell, supra note 48; Christina N. Gifford, Note, The Sonny
Bono Copyright Term Extension A ct, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 363 (2000) ; Karjala, Website,
supra note 24 (collecting materials submitted in opposition to term �xtension):Many of the
arguments made both in support of, and against, the Sony Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act were made a few years earlier, in the debate over the proposed 1995 Copyright Term
Extension Act, which was not enacted. See The Copyright Term Extension A ct, Hearings on
S. 483 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); Hearin,gs on H.R.
989 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the House Comm. on the Judi
ciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); Brownlee, supra note 4; Bryce, supra note 4; Hamilton,
supra note 4; Jaszi, supra note 4; Patry, supra note 4; Reichman, supra note 4; Dixon, supra
note 4; Lavigne, supra note 4. Because the two acts are so close in time and involved essen
tially the· same arguments and opposing parties, I will treat arguments raised in both in
stances largely interchangeably.
52. See, e.g., Karjala, Statement, supra note 51.
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incentive did exist for future works, such an added incentive could not
be used to justify extension of the term for works that had already been
created. That is, the works already exist, so the additional protection
could not possibly have any impact on incentives to create them.53
Opponents of term extension also argued that the extension would
impose substantial costs on the public by depriving it of freer access to
copyrighted works.54 In the wake of the Bono Act, the public must
now wait another twenty years before obtaining such access, even for
works that had already been created.55 During this period, the public
will continue to pay higher prices for those works.56 In addition,
authors who wish to use such works as the basis for new creative
works must expend effort and funds to license such uses from the
copyright owners for an additional twenty years.57 Thus, to many op
ponents of term extension, the Act represented little more than a
transfer of wealth from the public to existing copyright owners.58
Those supporting term extension responded by offering additional
justifications for the extension, separate and apart from the incentive
rationale set forth above.59 One justification was that incentives were
needed to convert nondigital works into digital form and to preserve
the digital copies given their fragile nature. That is, without additional
years to exploit the work, no one would invest the effort necessary to
53. See, e.g., James Boyle, Cruel, Mean, or Lavish? Economic A nalysis, Price Discrimi
nation and Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2007, 2036 (2000) ("Can you
really explain the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act economically, perhaps as an
attempt to offer incentives to the dead?"); Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 171 ("(I]t is important
to emphasize that the traditional justification of copyright protection, as an incentive to the
creation of works of authorship, simply does not apply to extension of the term of pre
existing works."); Travis, supra note 36, at 817-18. But see Hatch, supra note 7, at 736 (argu
ing that incentive impact results from the fact that existing authors, by receiving more reve
nue, are free to engage in other creative activities). But see Karjala, Statement, supra note 51
(debunking Hatch argument).
54. See BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4, at 57-76 (dis
puting claim that extension is "costless"); Karjala, Statement, supra note 51, at 11 (docu
menting the various costs).
55. See Karjala, Statement, supra note 51.
56. See Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 122 S.Ct. 1170 (2002) (No. 01-618) [hereinafter Economists' Brief];
Karjala, Statement, supra note 51 (refuting claim that public domain status has no impact on
prices); BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4, at 64-65 (same).
57. See Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 171 (arguing that retroactive extension "cannot en
hance the quantum of creativity from the past, but it can compromise the creativity of the
future, by delaying for twenty years the time at which subsequent authors may freely build
on these works").
58. See Karjala, Statement, supra note 51, at 5; Patry, supra note 4 (criticizing earlier bills
that would have extended the term).
59. See generally Hearings on H.R. 989 Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Intellectual
Prop. of the House Judiciary Committee, 104th Cong. 355-56 (1996) (statements of Bruce
Lehman and Marybeth Peters); Coble, supra note 7, at 296; Hatch, supra note 7, at 728;
Miller, supra note 7, at 325.
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preserve and digitize copyrighted works.6() A related argument, appli
cable to both digital and non-digital works, was that additional copy
right protection was necessary to provide incentives for continuing dis
tribution and promotion of existing works.61
Yet another justification, and the one that ultimately appeared
most persuasive to Congress,62 was based on the need to maintain a
positive trade surplus by harmonizing the copyright term with the
terms of European countries.63 The European Community ("EC") had
instituted a rule that provided foreign works protection for the shorter
of the EC term or the domestic term for the foreign country.64 Since
the term for many works in European countries is life plus seventy
years, many U.S. works under the earlier term would obtain twenty
years less protection in Europe. U.S. companies would thus, the argu
ment went, be operating under a disadvantage. This would have an un
favorable impact on our balance of trade, since the United States is a
net exporter of copyrighted works.
Opponents of term extension countered by arguing that these ad
ditional justifications were extremely weak and certainly not sufficient
to outweigh the substantial costs imposed by term extension. First,
opponents of term extension pointed out that there was no indication
or evidence that the existing copyright term was insufficient to provide
the incentives needed to digitize and preserve copyrighted works, or

60. See Coble, supra note 7, at 296; Hatch, supra note 7, at 728; Miller, supra note 7, at
325. Proponents of the extension also argued that the extension was warranted due to the
desire to provide a return for an author's descendants and increasing life expectancy. See
Hatch, supra note 7, at 732. But see BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra
note 4, at 145-47; William Patry, The Failure of the American Copyright System: Protecting
the Idle Rich, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 907, 931 (1997) [hereinafter Patry, Failure] (arguing
that this argument is "internally contradictory. While it is true that a longer lifespan means
that grandchildren of the author will live longer, it also means that the author will live longer
and, therefore, will be able to provide for his or her grandchildren for an equally longer pe
riod").
61. See, e.g., Hearing Held on Possible Extension of Copyright Term, 46 PAT. &
COPYRIGHT J. (B NA), at 467 (Sept. 30, 1993); see also William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright (U. Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No.
154, 2002) [hereinafter Landes & Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright], available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=319321 (last visited Nov. 10, 2002) (ar
guing that incentives may be necessary to commercialize works even after they have been
created).
62. See H.R. REP. NO 105-452 (1998), 1998 WL 120160; see also S. REP. No. 104-315
(1996), 1996 WL 397400 (report on an earlier, unpassed term extension bill).
.

63. See 105 CONG. REC. Sll,672-74, 794-96, H9949-54 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998); CONG.
REC. H9950 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998); The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearing on
S. 483 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 20, 23 (1995) (statement of
Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyright); Symposium, The Constitutionality of Copyright
Term Extension: How Long is Too Long?, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651, 690, 700
(2000) (statements by Arthur R. Miller and Jane C. Ginsburg); Ginsburg, supra note 35, at
171; Hatch, supra note 7, at 728-30.
64.

Council Directive 93/98, 1993 O.J. (L290) 9.
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that extending protection would increase such incentives.65 Indeed,
there was evidence suggesting just the opposite, that is, that continued
protection of works would in fact hinder such preservation efforts.66
Specifically, a number of entities had been engaged in digitizing and
making available on the Internet copies of works that had passed into
the public domain.67 By extending the term of protection, Congress
significantly hindered these ongoing attempts to digitize existing
works. Similarly, commentators questioned whether incentives were
necessary to ensure continuing distribution of already existing works,
particularly since such incentives are generally not necessary in other
non-copyright markets.68
Opponents also questioned the desirability of harmonization with
the terms of European countries and argued that, even if harmoniza
tion were desirable, the Bono Act did not in fact address the issue.69
As an initial matter, opponents argued that harmonization in the
abstract was not a satisfactory reason in itself without some under
standing of the costs and benefits of harmonization.70 Moreover, the
extension would not in fact truly harmonize protection, since other
term71 and non-term features of European copyright protection
65. See Travis, supra note 36, at 830 ("The wide availability of the works of Shakespeare
demonstrates that public domain works need not fall into obscurity.").
66. See Brief of Amici Curiae The Internet Archive Filed on Behalf of Petitioners,
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 122 S.Ct. 1062 (2002) (No. 01-618), available at http://eon.law.harvard.
edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/cert/archive-amicus.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2002) (arguing
that extension will in fact prevent attempts to digitally preserve certain older, copyrighted
works).
67. See id.
68. BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4, at 66 ("One of the
errors in this line of thinking is the assumption that the same policy imperative that applies
at the time of initial creation and dissemination also applies at later times . . . . [O]nce the
work has been created and a time sufficient to recoup investment has passed, there is no
more reason to assume a call for monopoly profits or subsidy here than with any other prod
uct."). Blll see Landes & Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, supra note 61 (suggesting
reasons why copyright markets might be different).
69. See generally BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4, at
191-214.
70. See Karjala, Statement, supra note 51; BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT
DURATION, supra note 4; Kenneth D. Crews, Harmonization and the Goals of Copyright:
Property Rights or Cultural Progress?, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 117, 135-38 (1998)
(critically analyzing congressional reliance on harmonization as a rationale for changes to
the copyright act); Jaszi, supra note 4, at 304; Patry, Failure, supra note 60, at 930 (arguing
that harmonization-based arguments for term extension are "entirely post hoc"); Reichman,
supra note 4, at 626, 639 (arguing that the proposed 1995 extension "cannot be justified in
terms of a drive for harmonization as such"); Jerome Epping, Jr., Comment, Harmonizing
the United States and Eutopean Community Copyright Terms: Needed Adjustment or Money
for Nothing?, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 183 (1996) (analyzing the extent to which term extension
would in fact harmonize protection).
71. Indeed, for certain categories of works such as sound recordings and works created
by corporate entities, the extended U.S. term would provide more protection than that given
to similar works in Europe. See, e.g., Patry, Failure, supra note 60, at 928-30. For example,
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regimes result in substantial differences in the treatment of copy
righted works, and these differences greatly outweigh the impact of
the copyright term.72 Finally, even if the Act did harmonize the scope
of protection, there was no evidence that lack of harmonization would
have any impact whatsoever on the U.S. trade balance.73
In the end, Congress passed the term extension, despite the fact
that the substantive policy arguments supporting term extension were
not terribly compelling.74 Although prospective extension of the term
could theoretically provide some minimal degree of additional incen
tive for creative activity, in practice, the added incentive is trivial.
Moreover, retroactive extension can find no reasonable incentive
based justification. And the alternative justifications proffered by
Congress, though facially plausible, were extremely weak, particularly
in light of the costs imposed by the extension. Indeed, the weakness of
the arguments in support of term extension is reflected in the fact that
the extension was opposed by an unusually wide array of copyright
scholars, including many who normally favor broader protection.75
Given the lack of strong policy support for term extension,
Congress's passage of the Bono Act can ultimately best be understood
as resulting, in large part, from the lobbying efforts of the copyright
industries (for example, film, music, publishing, software) which had
much to gain from an extension, particularly a retroactive one. Com
panies, such as Disney, with valuable copyrights that were slated to
expire within the next twenty years lobbied aggressively for the exten
sion.76 These companies had much to gain from retroactive extension
of their copyrights, since extension permitted them to protect and exthe European countries that recognize corporate authorship give such authors a term of 70
years, while the Bono Act gives similar authors a term of 95 years. See Karjala, Statement,
supra note 51 (providing many other examples where the Bono Act would result in different
terms of protection).
72. See Karjala, Statement, supra note 51; Netanel, supra note 9, at 74-75; see also
Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 172-73.
73. See Karjala, Statement, supra note 51.
74. See Bard & Kurlantzick, Millennium, supra note 4, at 61 ("What is striking about the
arguments offered by proponents of a lengthened copyright term is their lack of substance.
Virtually none of the reasons put forth for change have even a modicum of intellectual
merit.").
75. See Karjala, Statement, supra note 51 (listing signatories); Symposium, supra note 63,
at 698-702 (statement by Jane Ginsburg).
76. See Garon, supra note 36, at 523; Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solici
tude: Intellectual Property Law 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. R EV. 2187, 2236-37 (2000) (noting that
the copyright term extension "was the Walt Disney Company's 'highest priority' in the 1998
legislative session of Congress"); Robert Patrick Merges & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The
Proper Scope of the Copyright and Patent Power, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 45 (2000); Disney
Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey Mouse Effort, C H I. TRIB., Oct. 17, 1998, at 22.
The descendants of George Gershwin and other famous songwriters also lobbied heavily for
the extension. See John J. Fialka, Songwriters' Heirs Mourn Copyright Loss, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 30, 1997, at Bl.
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ploit their copyrights for an additional twenty years. At the same time,
the public interest groups and commentators who opposed the exten
sion had no similar lobbying power.77 And certainly the public at large
was not sufficiently exetdsed about a topic as abstract as copyright
term extension to exert any meaningful pressure on Congress to resist
industry calls for extension. Thus it is perhaps not surprising that the
extension was passed, despite the lack of strong policy justifications in
its support.
B.

Initial Responses to Term Extension

Concerned about the negative effects of copyright term extension
and Congress's apparent inability to resist calls for expansion from the
copyright industries, opponents of term extension turned to constitu
tional challenges. In Eldred v. Ashcroft,78 a number of parties brought
a declaratory judgment action arguing, among other things, that
Congress had exceeded the scope of the grant in the Constitution's
Copyright Clause. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the retroac
tive application of the extension did not "promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts," since there could be no justification for
trying to increase incentives for existing works. Moreover, Congress's
repeated prospective extensions violated the "limited Times" language
of the Copyright Clause by effectively extending the term indefi
nitely.79 Plaintiffs also argued that the term extension violated the First
Amendment. 80
The plaintiffs lost both before the D.C. District Court81 and the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.82 The majority opinion for
the D.C. Circuit panel rejected the argument that Congress had ex
ceeded the scope of the Constitution's Copyright Clause by extending
the term retroactively. The Court refused to construe the preamble of
the Copyright Clause - "To promote the Progress of Science and use
ful Arts" - as a substantive limitation on Congress's power.83 More
over, even if the preamble were a substantive limit, the court said the
77. See BARO & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4.
78. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. granted sub nom. Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. 1062 (2002). I should disclose that I signed an amicus brief in Eldred,
arguing that the retroactive portions of the term extension act are unconstitutional. Brief of
Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. 1170 (2002) (No. 01-618).
·

79. See jd. The plaintiffs also initially argued that retroactive extension violated the
Copyright Clause's originality requirement. Id.
80. Id.
81. See id.
82. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
83. See id. at 377-78.
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government's proffered justifications (that is, a need to provide incen
tives to preserve existing works, the need to harmonize the U.S. copy
right term with European terms, the need to preserve the United
States' balance of trade) were sufficient to "promote Progress" when
evaluated with proper deference to Congress's judgment.84 The Court
rejected additional arguments based on the First Amendment, holding
that the idea/expression dichotomy in copyright law and the existence
of a fair use defense were sufficient to protect any First Amendment
interests implicated by the extension.85 In dissent, Judge Sentelle ar
gued that Congress had exceeded the scope of its authority under the
Copyright Clause because the extension did not "promote the Prog
ress of Science and useful Arts,"86 and because the continual succes
sion of extensions violated the "limited Times" · language of the clause.
The D.C. Circuit denied the petition for rehearing en banc87 (over
a two-judge dissent88). The plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari to
the Supreme Court, which the Court granted.89 The case was heard by
the Supreme Court on October 9, 2002, and an opinion has yet to be
issued, as of the date of this writing.
The arguments raised in Eldred echoed similar arguments found in
the academic literature.00 Indeed the copyright term extension, along
84. See id. at 378-79.
85. See id. at 376.
86. See id. at 382 (Sentelle, J., dissenting in part) ("The government has offered no ten
able theory as to how retrospective extension can promote the useful arts.").
87. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 849 (D.C. Cir. 2001)

·

88. See id. at 855 (Sentelle, J., dissenting in part) (joined by Tatel, J.) ("Once a work is
published, however, extending the copyright term does absolutely nothing to induce further
creative activity by the author - and how could it? The work is already published. "), cert.
granted, 122 S.Ct. 1062 (2002).
89. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 122 S.Ct. 1062 (2002).
90. See, e.g., Floyd Abrams, First Amendment and Copyright, 35 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y
U.S.A. 1 (1987); Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information,
and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23 (2001); Oscar Cargill & Patrick A. Moran, Copyright Dura
tion v. the Constitution, 17 WAYNE L. REV. 917 (1971); Symposium, supra note 63; Michael
H. Davis, Extending Copyright and the Constitution: "Have I Stayed Too Long?", 52 FLA. L.
REV. 989 (2000); Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations
on the Protection of Expression, 67 CAL. L. REV. 283 (1979); Paul Goldstein, Copyright and
the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970); Heald & Sherry, supra note 9 (con
cluding that the term extension likely exceeded implied limits on Congressional authority
imposed by the Copyright Clause); Mark Lemley, The Constitutiona/ization of Technology
Law, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 529, 539 n.9 (2000) (listing articles); Lessig, supra note 9;
Merges & Reynolds, supra note 76; Netanel, supra note 9 (applying intermediate First
Amendment scrutiny to term extension and finding that term extension fails); Melville B.
Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and
Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970); Tyler Ochoa, Patent and Copyright Term Extensions
and the Constitution: A Historical Perspective, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 19 (2001); L.
Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1987) [hereinaf
ter Patterson, Free Speech]; L. Ray Patterson, Understanding the Copyright Clause, 47 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 365 (2000) [hereinafter Patterson, Understanding]; Edward C.
Walterscheid, Defining the Patent and Copyright Term: Term Limits and the Intellectual
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with a number of other recent legislative expansions of copyright pro
tection, have spawned a rich literature examining the potential limits
on Congress's power to expand copyright protection. Some commen
tators have argued that recent Congressional expansions, particularly
the retroactive extension of the copyright term, violate internal limits
imposed by the Constitution's intellectual property clause.91 Others
have argued that such expansions may violate external limits imposed
by the First Amendment.92 In all, a generous amount of scholarship
has been produced analyzing the term extension, much of it conclud
ing that the extension, at least the retroactive aspect of it, is constitu
tionally problematic.
There are limits, however, on the extent to which constitutional
arguments can effectively address the many issues raised by term ex
tension and the long period of copyright protection more generally.
True, some of these constitutional arguments are reasonably strong.
For example, the argument against retroactive term extension quite
possibly could be adopted by the Supreme Court in Eldred.93 The
constitutional case against prospective extension of the copyright
term, however, is far weaker.94 Moreover, even if the Supreme Court
were to strike down both the retrospective and prospective aspects of
the most recent term extension, it would still leave intact the ex
tremely long existing term of copyright protection.95
Thus, regardless of how the Supreme Court ultimately decides the
constitutional issue, many of the effects of a lengthy term will still be
Property Clause, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 315 (2000) (charting the history behind the Intellec
tual Property clause); Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression
Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work's " Total Concept and Feel," 38 EMORY L.J. 393 (1989);
see also Symposium, Eldred v. Ashcroft: Intellectual Property, Congressional Power, and the
Constitution, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. (f orthcoming fall 2002), available at http://llr.lls.edu.
91. See, e.g., Heald & Sherry, supra note 9; Patterson, Understanding, supra note 90;
Walterscheid, supra note 90.
92. See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 90; Lessig, supra note 9; Netanel, supra note 9.
93. Another case has also been filed in another circuit, with similar facts. See Golan v.
Ashcroft, Civ. No. 01-8-1854 (D. Colo. filed 2001), available at http:l/eon.law.harvard.edu/
openlaw/golanvashcroft/complaint.pdf.
94. Of course, if retroactive extension is ruled unconstitutional, the incentive to lobby
for future prospective extensions will be effectively eliminated, since those lobbying for such
extensions are primarily concerned with gaining additional protection for existing copy
righted works. The benefits from purely prospective term extension are so remote that they
would not justify the expenditure of any current funds for lobbying purposes. See infra
Section II.A. This is one of the tactical reasons supporting the retroactive attack in particu
lar. Elimination of retroactive term extension, however, would not address the current pro
spective extension nor, more generally, the already-too-long copyright term.
95. It is true that such a decision might well call into question the constitutionality of
prior copyright term extensions, and a subsequent lawsuit could well result in a judicial deci
sion striking down prior extensions. At this point, however, such a situation is rather specu
lative, particularly given the different context and justifications for prior extensions (for ex
ample, compliance with the Berne Convention). And either way, the term of copyright
protection will still be quite long.
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felt whether or not future extensions are permitted. Direct attacks on
term extension have little to say about what impact the existing length
of the term should have on the scope of copyright protection more
generally. That is, by focusing so narrowly on the end of the copyright
term, these constitutional arguments do not address the broader ques
tion of how the passage of time might affect copyright interests during
the lengthy existing copyright term. A constitutional challenge is thus
a rather blunt, though important, tool for addressing concerns about
the length of copyright protection.
·

C.

The Proposal - An Overview

Given that direct constitutional challenges to term extension do
not appear to fully address the issues raised by term extension, and
given that political pressure on the elected branches is more likely to
result in a longer rather than shorter copyright term, are there any
other means within existing doctrine to reduce the ill-effects of the
term extension? That is, are there less dramatic ways for courts to in
corporate some of the concerns raised by the opponents of term ex
tension into the existing structure and doctrine of copyright law?
I believe that the answer is yes. Indeed, I believe that existing
copyright law doctrines provide courts with the tools not only to miti
gate some of the ill-effects of the recent term extension, but also, more
broadly, to arrive at a much more well-balanced and finely-tuned un
derstanding of copyright scope, one· that for the first time recognizes
and takes account of the vast modern expansion of the copyright term
and its impact on the policies underlying copyright law. Which leads
me to my proposal.
The proposal is simple: in deciding whether a given use of a copy
righted work is fair use,96 courts should take into account how much
time has passed since the work was created.97 The more recent the
work, all other things being equal, the narrower the scope of fair use;
the older the work, the greater the scope of fair use. So, for example, a
book written seventy years ago should be subject to a greater degree
of fair use than a book written yesterday. The ability to make sequels,
to copy portions of the w.ork, to comment upon it, to transform and re
work it, should be greater than the similar ability to make fair use of a
book written only two years ago.
96. 17 u.s.c. § 107 (2000).
97. See also BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4, at 139
n.192 ("The doctrine of fair use, though, may be seen as a device which, on an ad hoc basis,
can modulate protection so as to bring it closer to the optimum . . . . ); Hughes, Fair Use,
supra note 10 (proposing that courts consider how much copyright protection remains, when
deciding fair use cases); Note, supra note 10, at 1209 (proposing that courts consider both
time and the size of the author's reward in deciding whether the re-writing of another
author's literary work constitutes fair use).
"
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Courts would implement this proposal rather straightforwardly
under existing copyright doctrine. The fair use defense in copyright
law is a flexible defense, designed to ensure that the entitlements
granted to authors not inadvertently hinder copyright's overall
purpose of encouraging widespread dissemination of creative
works. The defense privileges certain uses of copyrighted works for
purposes of comment, criticism, education, research, and news re
porting, even if such uses would otherwise be technically infring
ing.98 In assessing whether a use is fair, courts consider four statu
tory factors: the purpose and character of the use, the nature of the
copyrighted work, the amount of the original work used, and the
effect of the use upon the potential market for the work.99
Under the proposal in this Article, courts would simply consider
time as an additional factor in fair use analysis. Although the copy
right act lists only four factors, the text of the statute and its legislative
history clearly indicate that these factors are not meant to be exclu
sive.100 Instead, courts are meant to apply fair use in a flexible manner,
and indeed courts have considered many additional factors in deciding
fair use cases.101 Consideration of time as an additional factor would
thus fit rather easily within existing doctrine. For older works, this ad
ditional factor would weigh in favor of fair use, while for younger
works this factor would weigh against fair use. There would thus be
more "breathing space" for others to use, copy, transform, and com
ment upon older works.
To be clear, consideration of time in fair use analysis would not be
dispositive. Nor would the proposal here eliminate copyright protec
tion for older works. Rather, time would be a factor to be weighed
along with (and in some cases outweighed by) the other fair use fac
tors.102 Older works would still enjoy substantial protection under
copyright law, for example, against direct, commercial copying. How
ever, older works would have less protection against uses of the work
that involve traditionally fair uses.103 Thus, Mickey Mouse would still
have substantial protection against literal commercial copying, even
though he first appeared more than seventy years ago.104 However,

98. 17 u.s.c. § 107 (2000) .
99. Id.
100. See infra Section III.A.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. I describe this in much more detail (along with concrete examples) infra Section
IV.A.
104. See STEAMBOAT WILLIE (Walt Disney 1928).
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Mickey would be exposed to a greater degree of other critical, trans
formative, and derivative uses.105
In advancing this proposal, let me be clear about my motives. Like
many other commentators, I am troubled by the continuing expansion
of copyright protection on a number of different fronts. Specifically, I
believe that many of these expansions find little or no support under
any of the policy justifications underlying copyright law. At the same
time, the prospect of congressional action in this arena is unlikely,
given the structural imbalances in lobbying power. And constitutional
challenges to congressional action are an incomplete solution, even if
successful. Thus, this proposal is quite consciously an attempt to look
for ways within existing doctrine for courts to legitimately inject cer
tain public-regarding values into the scope of copyright protection.106
For those who share this view, this proposal should be very attractive.
But even for those who do not share this view, the proposal should
be attractive since it stands very much on its own two feet. That is, al
though the proposal in this Article was inspired by the perceived ill
effects of term extension, it turns out that the proposal has beneficial
effects and implications for copyright law more generally, beyond the
narrow issue of term extension. As I will show, the proposal finds very
strong support under virtually all of the underlying justifications for
copyright law. It provides a more finely-calibrated balance between
access and incentives, it encourages an appropriate amount of re-use
and adaptation of existing works, and it provides more measured
105. For purposes of simplification, I refer here, and elsewhere, to the characters them
selves, as opposed to the underlying creative works in which they first appeared. Copyright
law provides some level of protection for fictional characters that are sufficiently delineated,
although the precise scope and extent of such protection is not completely clear. See, e.g.,
D.C. Comics Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1982); Nichols v. Universal
Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930); 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 2.7.2.
106. This proposal is thus likely what Jane Ginsburg was concerned about in writing
that: "One unintended consequence of term extension, I fear, is to promote contentions that
the only way to offset the excessive term of copyright is to cut back on the scope of copyright
- to establish weaker derivative works protection or weaker protection across the board."
See Symposium, supra note 63, at 701. Others have suggested more generally that courts
should interpret fair use expansively in light of extensions in the copyright term. See, e.g.,
Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copy
right Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 7 (1997) ("Under the current scheme of
copyright, granting ever broader rights to copyright holders for ever longer periods of time,
the guarantee of the right of fair use must be protected and even expanded."); see also
Jessica Litman, Copyright and Information Policy, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PR OBS., Spring
1992, at 185 n.2, 207 (1992); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Evaluating Mistakes in Intellectual
Property Law: Configuring the System to Account for Imperfection, 4 J. SMALL &
EMERGING Bus. L.J. 167 (2000) (arguing that courts interpreting intellectual property stat
utes can play a role in compensating for imperfections in the legislative process); cf
BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 114 (1967) ("It is evident that
as rights are strengthened, they need run, and can be endured, only for a correspondingly
shorter period."); Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent Length and Breadth, 21
RAND. J. ECON. 106 (1990) (discussing the interaction of length and breadth of protection in
the patent context).
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rewards to author& for their creative labor. These are all good reasons,
within existing copyright law theory, to support the proposal. Thus,
whatever one thinks about recent expansions in copyright protection,
the proposal advanced in this Article will have significant benefits for
copyright law generally.
II.

THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS

Before examining the doctrinal argument in support of my pro
posal, I want to establish the reason to construct it in the first place that is, that time should matter in fair use analysis. As it turns out, an
examination of a number of policy justifications underlying copyright
law reveals that there is extremely strong support for considering time
in setting the proper scope of copyright protection. Indeed, the sup
port is so strong that it is surprising that courts have yet to explicitly
vary the scope of copyright protection over time, particularly given the
vast current term of copyright protection.
A. Incentives and Access
The primary policy justification for copyright protection in the
United States is the incentive justification. The familiar argument goes
like this: copyright protection is necessary to provide adequate incen
tives for authors to engage in creative activity. Without such protec
tion, others could easily copy and distribute an author's works, quickly
driving the price of the work down to the marginal cost of producing
an additional copy.107 Authors would thus be unable to recoup the
costs of their original creative labor.108 As a result, authors would not
choose to engage in such labor in the first place, and creative works
would not be produced in adequate numbers.109 Copyright law solves
this problem by providing incentives to engage in creative labor,
thereby harnessing the economic self-interest of authors to the benefit
of society at large.

107. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copy
right Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 333 (1989) [hereinafter Landes & Posner, Economic
Analysis]; Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J.
283 (1996).
108. But see Breyer, supra note 50 (arguing that this may not be the case in the market
for books, in light of first-mover advantages and other factors). See also Barry W. Tyerman
The Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection for Published Books: A Reply to Professor
Breyer, 18 UCLA L. REV. 1100 (1981) (disputing Breyer's claims). See generally BARD &
KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4, at 26 n.32 (discussing non-monetary
incentives more generally).
109. The term "adequate" here is deliberately fuzzy, as much disagreement exists over
what is adequate.
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At first blush, the incentive argument would appear to justify fur
ther extension of the copyright term.11° After all, if some incentive is
good, why isn't more incentive even better? The familiar answer is
that protection comes at a cost. Copyright law provides incentives to
authors, but only by enabling authors to restrict dissemination of the
work.111 In economic terms, copyright law permits an author to raise
the price of the work above the marginal cost of producing an addi
tional copy. This provides an incentive to the author, but it also means
that those who would have purchased the copy at or above the mar
ginal cost but below the higher price cannot get access to the work.112
Copyright law thus presents a trade-off.1 13 Roughly speaking, depend
ing on the strength of the protection, we can have more works with
more restricted access, or fewer works with broader access.114

110. This i s true a t least with respect t o future works. A s noted earlier, this justification
cannot reasonably be applied to works that have already been created.
111. See 1 T.B. MACAULAY, MACAULAY'S SPEECHES AND POEMS 285 (A.C.
Armstrong & Son 1874) ("It is good that authors should be remunerated; and the least
exceptional way of remunerating them is by a monopoly. Yet monopoly is an evil. For the
sake of the good we must submit to the evil; but the evil ought not to last a day longer than is
necessary for the purpose of securing the good.").
112. This is the deadweight or static efficiency loss. See, e.g., Economists' Brief, supra
note 56, at 10-12; William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1659 (1988); Richard J. Gilbert & Michael L. Katz, When Good Value Chains Go Bad:
The Economics of Indirect Liability for Copyright Infringement, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 961, 96364 (2001); Netanel, supra note 107.
1 13. See ROB ERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 135 (1988)
("[T]he dilemma is that without a legal monopoly not enough information will be produced
but with the legal monopoly too little of the information will be used."); Glynn S. Lunney,
Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483 (1996).
114. Some commentators have argued t�at this loss can be avoided if the author can en
gage in price discrimination. See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of
Automated Rights Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557, 596600 (1998); Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
217; see also Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293
(1970); William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1203, 1234-40 (1998); Fisher, supra note 112. Thus, for some (that is, so-called "maximalists"
or "neoclassicists"), an optimal term might be perpetual, assuming that the Constitution did
not foreclose this option. See Netanel, supra note 107, at 367-68 ("Neoclassicism, therefore,
has no reason to extinguish the owner's copyright after a term of years."). It isn't clear to me,
however, that the conditions that would permit perfect (or even close to perfect) price dis
crimination exist in real copyright markets. See, e.g., CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN,
INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 53 (1999); Ben
Depoorter & Francisco Parisi, Fair Use and Copyright Protection: A Price Theory Explana
tion, 21 INT. REV. L. & ECON. 453 (2002); Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright
Law and the Incidents of Copy Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1321-22 (2001);
Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55
(2001). Moreover even if they did, other more fundamental objections (including the one in
the following paragraph) exist to this price discrimination model. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler,
An Unhurried View of Private Ordering in Information Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063
(2000) ; Boyle, supra note 53; Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L.
REV. 1799 (2000); Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of
"Rights Management, " 97 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1998); Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property
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Copyright law also presents another trade-off, this one not be
tween authors and consumers, but between authors and other authors.
It is a commonplace that new works draw from and build upon old
ones.1 15 No work is purely and completely new. All works draw upon
prior works, to at least some extent. Thus, by increasing protection for
initial works, we may increase the incentives for producing such
works, but we also increase the cost of producing works that draw
upon these initial works.1 16 If protection is too great, we may in fact
decrease the number of total works (that is, the sum of both original
and follow-on works). If our aim is to provide adequate incentives for
both initial and follow-on works, the strength of copyright protection
needs to reflect this balance.117
The length of the copyright term is one way (among many ways) in
which this balance is struck.118 Too short a term, and the incentives
may not be sufficient to spur initial creation, since authors may not
have enough time to obtain sufficient compensation for their efforts.
Too long a term, and the work may not be widely disseminated or
built upon over time.119 The optimal or ideal copyright term is proba
bly impossible to determine in any meaningful way.120 Indeed, the acaas Price Discrimination: Implications for Contract, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1367, 1369 {1998);
Loren, supra note 106; Netanel, supra note 107, at 368.
1 15. See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 209, 218 (1983); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The
Metamorphosis of "Authorship, " 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 457-63; Litman, supra note 30, at 96667 ("But the very act of authorship in any medium is more akin to translation and recombi
nation than it is to creating Aphrodite from the foam of the sea.").
116. See Economists' Brief, supra note 56, at 12-13; Gilbert & Katz, supra note 1 12, at
964-65; Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism
in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1557 (1993); Landes & Pos
ner, Economic Analysis, supra note 107, at 333.
117. See Landes & Posner, Economic Analysis, supra note 107; Mark Lemley, The Eco
nomics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEXAS L. REV. 989 {1997); Netanel,
supra note 107, at 295 ("An overly expanded copyright also constitutes a material disincen
tive to the production and dissemination of creative, transformative uses of preexisting ex
pression.").
118. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("The lim
ited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly, like the limited copyright duration
required by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest:
Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately
serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other
arts.").
1 19. See Walterscheid, supra note 90, at 359 (discussing this balance). Bur see Landes &
Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, supra note 61 (proposing a regime in which copy
rights could be repeatedly renewed).
120. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 (1976), at 1 33, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5749 ("The debate over how long a copyright should last is as old as the oldest copyright
statute and will doubtless continue as long as there is a copyright law."); Netanel, supra note
107, at 369 ("(l]t is difficult, if not impossible, to determine with any degree of precision the
term of copyright that would lead to optimum support for creative autonomy, while still al
lowing for sufficient user access.").
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demic literature on this point has provided no firm guidance.121 Differ
ent types of works may require different lengths of protection (for ex
ample, protecting software for ten years would probably be sufficient,
at least under today's market conditions, given how quickly software
becomes obsolete).122 Even within a given category of work, much
might depend on how the market is structured at that particular time,
what other incentives exist, etc. Thus, a high degree of uncertainty will
inevitably attend discussions about the proper term. The precise num
ber chosen will always be, to some extent, arbitrary.123 Thus Congress
should properly be given some degree of discretion in setting the
term.124
Even conceding a good degree of Congressional discretion, how
ever, there are good reasons to believe that the current period is too
long, i.e. that it substantially hinders access without a corresponding
benefit in incentives.125 Under an incentive justification, the reason for
the copyright extension is that it will increase the incentives for the
121. See BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4; Saul Cohen,
Duration, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1977); Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual Property: Old
Boundaries and New Frontiers, 76 IND. L.J. 803, 825 (2001) (discussing duration); Landes &
Posner, Economic Analysis, supra note 107; Landes & Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copy
right, supra note 61; Walterscheid, supra note 90, at 359-60; Edward C. Walterscheid, The
Remarkable - And Irrational - Disparity Between the Patent Term and the Copyright Term,
83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 233 (2001); see also JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS,
SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY
172 (1996) (suggesting a twenty-year term); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS:
THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 251 (2001) (proposing a series of
renewable 5-year terms). Similar literature exists regarding the optimal patent term (with
similarly little in the way of firm guidance). See, e.g., WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION,
GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
76-86 (1969); Gilbert & Shapiro, supra note 106; Paul Klemperer, How Broad Should the
Scope of Patent Protection Be?, 21 RAND J. ECON. 113 (1990).
122. See BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4, at 137 n.192;
RALPH S. BROWN & ROBERT C. DENICOLA, CASES ON COPYRIGHT, UNFAIR
COMPETITION, AND RELATED TOPICS BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY,
MUSICAL, AND ARTISTIC WORKS 487 (7th ed. 1998) (suggesting possibility of varying terms
depending on nature of the work).
123. The discussion here focuses on how long the copyright term should be as a matter
of theory. For a historical explanation for the copyright term, see Walterscheid, supra note
90, at 381-86.
124. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Stu
dios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 380 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Note,
however, that such discretion also provides a strong incentive for interested parties to peti
tion for extensions of the time period. See infra Section II.D.
125. See Symposium, supra note 63, at 677 (comments by Wendy Gordon) (suggesting
that "an instrumentalist would oppose the extension [because] [i]t provides twenty more
years of making works expensive and difficult to access, without giving a compensating gain
in incentives"); William M. Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Images, and Appropriation Art: An
Economic Approach, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1 (2001) (calling the current long duration of
copyright "a major economic puzzle" and rejecting proffered explanations as implausible);
Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1149, 1244
(1998) ("It is scarcely credible that authors' or publishers' decisions, say, in 1998 will be af
fected by rights that their successors will have in 2073 and thereafter.").
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creation of new works. As a matter of simple economics, however, ad
ditional increases in the copyright term result in ever-decreasing
amounts of additional incentive. For the vast majority of works, there
will be little demand more than fifty years after the death of the
author.126 Even for those few works that still retain some market value,
the present value of any future income streams will be miniscule. This
is because of the simple economic phenomenon of the time value of
money.127
To see this, take the following example.128 Assume, for simplicity's
sake, that an author creates a work in 2000 at age forty and dies in the
year 2030 at age seventy. The term of protection under the 1976 Act
would have been until the year 2080. Under the term extension, how
ever, the term will now expire in 2100. What was the incentive value of
that additional twenty years? Let's assume a discount rate of ten per
cent. Let's further assume that the author is one of the very fortunate
few whose work is still generating some revenue for his estate from
2081 through 2100. If the work generated one dollar each year for the
period from 2081 through 2100, the net present value of that cash flow
would be about 0.42 cents, or just under half a penny.129 If the work is
126. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5 ("According to the 1961 Report of the Register of
Copyrights, fewer than fifteen percent of all copyrights were renewed under the 1909 Act.").
127. See Affidavit of Hal R. Varian <j[ 3, Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1 {D.D.C. 1999)
{No. 99-0065) [hereinafter Varian Affida'(it] {"In my opinion, extending current copyright
terms by 20 years for new works has a tiny effect on the present value of cash flows from
creative works and will therefore have an insignificant effect on the incentives to produce
such works."), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/eldredvreno/varian.pdf (last visited
Feb. 1, 2002); Economists' Brief, supra note 56; BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT
DURATION, supra note 4, at 60; RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 4647 (5th ed. 1998) ("[A]s a result of discounting to present value, the knowledge that you may
be entitled to a royalty on your book 50 to 100 years after you publish it is unlikely to affect
your behavior today.") (internal citation omitted); Breyer, supra note 50, at 324 .("More
probably authors, like others, discount the value of future income, and, when discounted, the
present value of a future copyright advantage is small."); Robert C. Denicola, Freedom to
Copy, 108 YALE L.J. 1661, 1679 (1999) ("At some point, attempts to defend increased dura
tion on incentive grounds become implausible because of the decreasing time value of
money. "); Merges, supra note 76, at 2236-37 ("From an incentive point of view, the Act is
virtually worthless; viewed from a present-value perspective, the additional incentive to cre
ate a copyrightable work is negligible for an extension of copyright from life-plus-fifty years
to life-plus-seventy years."). Indeed, this very basic point was recognized as early as 150
years ago by Macaulay: "[A]n advantage that is to be enjoyed more than half a century after
we are dead, by somebody, we know not by whom, perhaps by somebody unborn, by some
body utterly unconnected with us, is really no motive at all to action." See 1 MACAULAY,
supra note 111, at 286, quoted in Zechariah Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: II,
45 COLUM. L. REV. 719 (1 945).
128. This example is adapted from Economists' Brief, supra note 56, and Varian Affida
vit, supra note 127. For similar calculations, see Karjala, Statement, supra note 51, at 23;
Landes & Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, supra note 61.
129. The present value of a future payment of $1 is 1/{l+r)"n, where r is the discount
rate and n is the number of years in the future when the payment is made. See Varian Affi
davit, supra note 127. The 0.42-cent figure is simply the sum of the present values for $1
payments from years 2081 through 2100.
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successful, generating say $100,000 per year even that far out into the
future, the present value of that cash flow would be approximately
$420.

Moreover, we have assumed, unrealistically, that the return is ab
solutely certain. If we instead discount that amount further by the un
certainty associated with receiving any revenue eighty years later, the
amount would be even less. If, for example, only one percent130 of
published novels have any kind of staying power fifty years later, the
expected value would be $4.20. Thus, in order to accept the incentive
justification, one would need to believe that the prospect of an addi
tional $4.20 to the author in 2000 would be sufficient to result in an
appreciable increase in creative effort. 131
Yet one needn't accept this argument, or even believe that the cur
rent period is too long, to accept the argument that time should at
least have some impact on the level of protection. That is because, if
we accept the incentive argument for copyright protection, the value
of the additional incentive to the author decreases the further out we
go on the copyright term. This is again the result of the time value of
money. Revenue from the first ten years of protection is more valu
able than revenue from the next (assuming the amounts of revenue
are the same), because the revenue from the next ten years is subject
to a greater period of discounting.132 And so on. Thus, the present
value, and therefore incentive impact, of revenue in the last twenty
years of a copyright's term is far less than the first. In the example
above, assuming the same revenue received in the first twenty years,
the net present value of that cash flow, even prior to discounting to ac
count for the probability of continued success, would be more than
$850,000 compared to $420 from the last twenty years. The incentive
130. This figure is likely generous. Rates of copyright renewal under the pre-1976 re
gime are an indicator of the economic value of copyrighted works over time. These renewal
rates suggest that the vast majority of works did not have sufficient value to warrant even the
minimal cost of renewal, even twenty-eight years after publication. See 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 5 ("According to the 1961 Report of the Register of Copyrights, fewer than fifteen per
cent of all copyrights were renewed under the 1909 Act."); Barbara A. Ringer, Renewal of
Copyright, in 1 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 503, 617 (Copyright Society of the U.S.A. ed.,
1963); see also Landes & Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, supra note 61, at 22-28
(empirical study of copyright renewal rates indicating that fewer than eleven percent of
copyrights registered from 1883 to 1964 were renewed, and concluding that "copyrights are
subject to significant depreciation and have an expected or average life of only about 15
years"); id. at 28 (estimating that "fewer than 1 in 750 works registered in 1934 will have
commercial value in 2030").
131. This analysis is, admittedly, simplified. To get a truly accurate picture of the incen
tives involved, one would need to have more concrete data on the range of different possible
income streams for various types of works, and the likelihood of each income stream in fact
occurring, etc. However, the analysis does at least give a rough impression of how time im
pacts the value of income streams that far in the future.
132. See Varian Affidavit, supra note 127; F.M. Scherer, Nordhaus' Theory of Optimal
Patent Life: A Geometric Reinterpretation, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 422, 424 (1972) (noting exact
same phenomenon as relevant in setting optimal patent term).
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impact of the last twenty years is thus 0.049% of the incentive impact
of the first twenty years. And again, even this understates the differen
tial, since it does not adjust for the very likely possibility that revenue
streams would significantly be reduced (perhaps to nothing) as the
work becomes older.133 Accordingly, under the incentive view, the fur
ther out we go in the term, the less we should be concerned about the
incentive effects134 of finding no or less protection.135
Conversely, there may be quite strong reasons to be concerned
about ensuring widespread access over time. The more time that
elapses from creation, the more difficult it will be for a potential pur
chaser or licensor to determine who owns the copyright.136 The prob
lems associated with finding the holders of copyrights have been well
documented.137' In some cases, a work may no longer be published.138
In other cases, difficulties may result because the original author is de
ceased, and the heirs or devisees need to be identified and contacted.
Alternatively, the more time has passed, the more likely it is that the
copyright has been transferred to other parties, perhaps several times,
133. To see how quickly the incentive effect falls off, consider the present value of
$100,000 annual cashflows for the following periods: 2001-2020: $851 ,356; 2021-2040:
$126,549; 2041 -2060: $18,811; 2061-2080: $2,796; 2081-2100: $416. As a percentage of the to
tal return over the entire 100-year period, the figures are: 2001-2020: 85.14%; 2021-2040:
12.66%; 2041-2060: l.88%; 2061-2080: 0.28%; 2081-2100: 0.042%.
134. Justin Hughes identifies, and primarily bases his similar proposal upon, another
way in which concerns about incentives are less important near the end of the copyright
term. Focusing specifically on more minor uses which could cause harm if they became more
widespread (such as personal copying), Hughes notes that the aggregate market harm from
such uses is necessarily less if they arise late in the copyright term because there is a shorter
period of remaining time during which the harm will be felt. See Hughes, Fair Use, supra
note IO.
135. Note that this holds true even under theories of copyright law that argue that the
incentive impact results, not necessarily from the return from any given work, but from the
potential of ever creating a work that generates an exceptional amount of revenue. See, e.g.,
Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considerations in the Intellectual Property Protection of
Software, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 350-51 {1995). Even under this view, the future revenues
from a "hit" must be discounted over the lengthy copyright term. Similarly, the analysis ap
plies as well to arguments sometimes made that extension of the copyright term is intended
to benefit an author's descendants, since the amount of this benefit is subject to discounting
as well. See Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 172 ("The 1 976 Act term already allowed authors to
provide for children and grandchildren; will the addition of great-grandchildren to the pro
spective beneficiaries of the author's work likely inspire the creation of another song or se
quel?").
136. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 125 (2d ed. 1997)
(discussing tracing costs); Landes & Posner, Economic Analysis, supra note 107, at 361.
137. See BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4, at 57-58; see
also, e.g. , Frances M. Nevins, Little Copyright Dispute on the Prairie: Unbumping the Will of
Laura Ingalls Wilder, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 919 (2000) (documenting dispute over copyright
ownership of the Little House on the Prairie series).
138. See Breyer, supra note 50, at 325 ("[A]s time passes persons wishing to reproduce
old articles, books, designs, or other writings find it progressively harder to find the copy
right owner to secure permission - particularly when copying is necessary because, for ex
ample, a book is out of print.").
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and the more complicated it is to identify and contact the current
holders. There may also be a good deal of uncertainty over who ex
actly owns the rights, due to the rather complex provisions of the
Copyright Act involving renewals,139 termination of transfer,140 and in
heritance.141 Finally, complexities about formalities,142 renewal143 and
copyright term extension may call into doubt whether the work is even
still copyrighted.144 All of these problems become more acute as the
time from creation increases and records and memories grow thin,
thus making access to the work more problematic as time passes.145 In
deed, these costs have been viewed by some as the primary policy rea
son for the limited term.146
In addition, as time passes, the interest in having works that build
upon the original increases. As mentioned above, one of the trade-offs
in copyright law involves balancing incentives between initial works
and follow-on works. 147 The elements of this trade-off vary across time.
In the initial years of a copyright's term, we are more concerned with
compensating the original author for his or her creative labor, since
these years have the greatest incentive effect. Over time, however,
that incentive wanes, as discussed above. Conversely, as developed in
more detail in the following section, the longer a work has been avail
able to the public the more it becomes a likely candidate for others to
build upon. It becomes part of the stock of works that future authors
139. See 17 U.S.C. § 304 {2000) .
140. See 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2000).
141. See id.
142. See 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, §§ 3.0-3.19.
143. See id. § 4.9.
144. The Copyright Act does include certain record-keeping provisions designed to
make it easier to determine whether a work is copyrighted and who owns it. See, e.g., 17
U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(4), 205, 302(d), 408, 705 (2000) . And as more records are made available
over the Internet, some of the above costs may be reduced. See Bell, supra note 114 (making
broader point that the Internet will reduce licensing costs online); Landes & Posner, Indefi
nitely Renewable Copyright, supra note 61, at 6 (noting that such costs could be reduced pro
spectively). However, the difficulties associated with determining copyright status and own
ership still remain formidable. See Bard & Kurlantzick, Millennium, supra note 4, at 22 n.27.
145. See Economists' Brief, supra note 56, at 13; BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT
DURATION, supra note 4, at 59 ("The costs that copyright imposes are likely to increase as
the period of protection lengthens."); id. at 59 n.91 (describing the various costs); Cohen,
supra note 121, at 1185; Gilbert & Shapiro, supra note 106, at 112 n.3 (noting same phe
nomenon in the patent context). Although this is a general rule, there may, of course, be ex
ceptions. For example, there is little doubt about who owns the rights to Mickey Mouse.
Thus, in some cases time may not accurately reflect this interest. I will address this in more
detail below in Section IV.B, as part of my general response to the objection that time is
merely a proxy for other factors that should be considered expressly.
146. See Cohen, supra note 121, at 1185; Landes & Posner, Economic Analysis, supra
note 107; see also White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 19 (1907)
(Holmes, J., concurring).
147. See Lemley, supra note 117.
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have encountered and upon which they might want to build.148 Even if
it is possible to license the right to create a derivative work from the
copyright holder, any license fee (not to mention the tracing and nego
tiation costs already discussed) serves to increase the cost (and reduce
the incentives) for such follow-on works. Accordingly, to the extent
that we are interested in balancing incentives for both initial and sec
ondary works, fair use should vary over time.149
Thus, even if we cannot say with any certainty what the optimal
length of the copyright term should be, we can say with confidence
that time should at the very least be relevant under the incentive justi
fication, and that the scope of copyright protection should properly be
sensitive to the impact of time on incentives and access. The longer a
work has been out, the weaker the incentive claim and the greater the
access claim. Thus, one would expect the scope of copyright protection
to decrease over time, under the incentive view.150
B.

Encouraging Re-Use and Critique

Sometimes one hears a variation of the incentive argument that
goes like this: copyrights (and other intellectual property rights) are
needed not only to provide incentives for the initial creation of crea
tive works, but also for their orderly exploitation. That is, we give ex
clusive rights to copyright owners not only so that they have an incen
tive to write a book as an initial matter, but so they can also have
control over sequels, movies based on the book, and other derivative
works. Although this "prospect theory" has been most powerful in the
148. Indeed, for some particularly famous works, there may effectively be no reasonable
substitutes. See Symposium, supra note 63, at 707-08 (statement of Wendy Gordon);
Gordon, supra note 116; cf Breyer, supra note 50, at 324 n.170 (suggesting that owners of
copyrights in works that achieve "classic" status may be subject to less price competition
since there will be fewer substitutes).
149. See Lemley, supra note 1 17, at 999 ("The limited duration of patents and copyrights
promotes improvements in writings and inventions, by allowing subsequent authors and in
ventors to build upon what came before them.").
150. A number of commentators, in discussing term extension, have argued that to accu
rately balance the costs and benefits of term extension, we need to discount both the costs
and the benefits. See Breyer, supra note 50, at 327 n.181; see also Hatch, supra note 7, at 736;
Landes & Posner, Economic Analysis, supra note 107, at 362. That is, just as we discount the
future revenue streams from additional protection, we should also discount the loss to con
sumers and others from extension. See Hatch, supra note 7, at 736-37; accord Economists'
Brief, supra note 56, at 12-15. However, this observation does not undercut the proposal in
this Article, since what is relevant is not an absolute comparison of costs and benefits as we
progress further out in the copyright term. Instead, what is relevant is the relative signifi
cance of costs and benefits over time. That is, costs (such as tracing and other transactions
costs) can be expected to increase as we progress further out in the copyright term, whereas
revenues can generally be expected to stay constant or, more likely, decrease as the work
fades in importance. (This latter assumption, while probably true in most cases, may not be
true in all, and I discuss these cases in Section IV.B, infra). Thus, even if we discount both
costs and benefits, the relative weight of these two factors can be expected to change over
the copyright term, thus lending support to the proposal that time should make a difference.
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field of patents,151 it has had some impact on copyright as well, par
ticularly in the area of derivative works. The basic idea is that only one
party should have control over Mickey Mouse.152 Imagine if anyone in
the world could make their own Mickey Mouse movie. We would soon
have different versions of Mickey (for example, evil Mickey, Mickey
in space, an Asian Mickey), and the value created by the original
author would be dissipated.153 Thus, copyright law needs to extend
protection to works to provide for orderly development and careful
preservation of value.154
As an initial matter, there are some theoretical limitations to this
justification for copyright law. Unlike patent law, copyright law is, in
Paul Goldstein's terms, centrifugal rather than centripetal.155 Patent
law deals with inventions and processes, and the overarching ideal is
efficiency. That is, we want technology and innovation to converge on
the most efficient solution or set of solutions. Under such conditions,
orderly development of technology may make sense. By contrast,
copyright seeks a diversity of expression. It is designed to permit
variations, new expressions built upon existing ideas.156 We are not ter
ribly disturbed by the idea that anyone can make a movie re-telling, in
any form, the story of Romeo and Juliet157 or record a new interpreta
tion of a Beethoven Symphony - indeed, this is generally seen as a
good thing. While some ability to control derivative works may be de
sirable, too much control may not be. The prospect theory thus has
more limited application in the copyright arena.
Even within the prospect justification, however, there is ample
support for the idea that the scope of copyright should vary with time.
It may well be that an author should be given some period of time
during which to develop and control variations or derivative works
151. See, e.g., Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
ECON. 265 (1977).
152. See Lessig, supra note 9, at 1069; Justin Hughes, "Recoding" Intellectual Property
and Overlooked A udience Interests, 77 TEXAS L. REV. 923, 984-86 (1999) [hereinafter
Hughes, Recoding].
153. See Landes & Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, supra note 61, at 12-13
(analogizing this to over-grazing of common pasture).
154. See H ughes, Recoding, supra note 152; Landes & Posner, Economic Analysis, supra
note 107; Landes & Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, supra note 61, at 15-16 (ana
lyzing this in terms of "congestion externalities"); Jane Ginsburg, Essay, Copyright and In
termediate Users' Rights, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 67 (1999).
155. See Paul Goldstein, Infringement of Copyright in Computer Programs, 47 U. PITI.
L. REV. 1119, 1 123 (1986) ("The aim of copyright is to direct investment toward abundant
rather than efficient expression.").
156. See Economists' Brief, supra note 56, at 14; Goldstein, supra note 155; Gordon, su
pra note 1 16, at 1557; Robert Merges, Are You Making Fun of Me? Notes on Market Failure
and the Parody Defense in Copyright, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 305 (1993).
157. Compare WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF ROMEO AND JULIET, with
WEST SIDE STORY (United Artists 1961), and ROMEO + JULIET (20th Century Fox 1996).

438

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 101:409

based upon the original work. This could be justified on both a straight
incentive rationale and a prospect rationale. Over time, however, that
justification weakens, since the author has already had ample oppor
tunity to engage in such development. Thus, it may be fair to give an
author at least ten, perhaps twenty or even thirty years to write one or
several sequels. But if she hasn't written a sequel after fifty years, per
haps her interest in controlling the orderly development of the work is
more attenuated and others should be permitted to build more aggres
sively on the work.158 Alternatively, if she has written twenty sequels in
the intervening years, then perhaps she has adequately fulfilled that
interest and the work should now be subject to interpretation from
other perspectives. Either way, her interest, like the incentive interest,
grows weaker as time passes.159
At the same time, society's interest in seeing different perspectives
and re-interpretations of the original work increases over time. In
deed, a number of commentators have argued that copyright must do
more to actively support an interest in the reinterpretation of copy
righted works.160 In recent years, a number of scholars have critiqued
the recent expansion of intellectual property law, focusing in particu
lar on the extent to which the expansion hinders the ability of others
to re-cast, transform, and derive new meanings from existing copy
righted works. These arguments have been particularly forceful in the
areas of trademark law161 and the right of publicity.162 The basic claim
is that people must have some degree of freedom to play with intellec
tual goods, to re-cast them, to imbue them with meanings independent
of the ones that the original author intended, in order to make sense
of them. These transformative activities are an essential part of what it
158. See LESSIG, supra note 121, at 258-59 (suggesting a "use it or lose it" system where,
if a work is not made commercially available, others would be permitted to use it, perhaps
under a compulsory license); JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 12-14 (2001 ).
159. And certainly such an interest in giving an author time to fully realize his or her
artistic vision is not applicable after the author is dead. Indeed, it is unclear how this interest
would be served by giving such a right to the author's heirs or transferees. See BARD &
KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4, at 120-21 n.159.
1 60. See, e.g., ROSEMARY COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW (1998); JANE GAINES,
CONTESTED CULTURE: THE IMAGE, THE VOICE, AND THE LAW (1991); KAPLAN, supra
note 106, at 74-75; Rosemary Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellec
tual Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEXAS L. REV. 1853 (1991); Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation,
65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397 (1990); Fisher, supra note 112; Alex Kozinski, Mickey & Me,
11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 465, 467 (1994); David Lange, At Play in the Fields of
the Word: Copyright and the Construction of Authorship in the Post-Literate Millennium, 55
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1992, at 139; Liu, supra note 1 14, at 1327-29; Michael
Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL.
L. REV. 127 (1993).
161. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 160.
162. See, e.g., Madow, supra note 1 60.
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means to consume an intellectual good.163 Although these scholars
recognize the need to provide incentives for the creation of such
works, they are concerned that the scope of protection should not be
so expansive as to limit essential critique and transformation.164
These interests provide further support for consideration of time in
fair use analysis. Again, one need not buy the argument in its entirety
or even agree with any particular implementation; one need only rec
ognize that time has an impact on the relative importance of this
value. As discussed above, over time the original author's interest in
controlling orderly exploitation of the work wanes. At the same time,
as time passes the copyrighted work is more likely to be part of the
common stock of works and ideas that others have encountered and
wish to build upon. The longer a work has been published, the more
desirable it becomes as material for discussion or re-casting.165 The
longer a work has been out, the more likely it is that other authors will
have encountered it and wish to build upon it or incorporate it into
their own subsequent works.166
Copyright law already recognizes this to some extent (in theory, if
not in practice),167 through the limited copyright term. As their copy
right terms expire, works pass from protected status into the public
domain where they can be freely built upon, transformed, re-cast, and
re-imagined by others. According to many commentators, the public
163. See Lange, supra note 160.
164. See also Netanel, supra note 107, at 369 (deriving limit from copyright's role in cre
ating conditions for a democratic civil society).
165. See BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4, at 60 ("Indeed,
contrary to what is often asserted or assumed, the fact that a particular work enjoys lasting
popularity is not a reason to extend the term of copyright but rather a reason to limit it. Its
continued value heightens the interest in widespread dissemination and underlines the con
tribution to national culture and learning which follows from its entrance into the public
domain where it can function as a building block of intellectual and imaginative activity.");
Gordon, supra note 116; Note, Originality, 1 15 HARV. L. REV. 1988, 1 993 (2002) ("When
certain texts have shaped our means of talking and thinking about important ideas, riffing on
those texts in new literary works is a powerful way to refashion our language, worldview,
and aesthetic. Such canonical texts are likely to be old, and thus to be in the public domain.
But many famous texts are still under copyright.").
166. See Note, supra note 10, at 1209 (proposing that courts deciding cases involving an
author's re-telling of another's literary work expressly consider whether the original work
"occupies a place of such culturally iconic status that not to permit a re-writing of it would
suppress important and necessary discussion of that work.").
167. The extension of the copyright term is but one of the ways in which passage of
copyrighted works into the public domain has been hindered. Prior to 1976, copyright law
required compliance with a number of formalities, such as notice, and if such formalities
were not observed, a work would pass into the public domain. Thus, many works in fact
passed into the public domain as a result of failure to comply with formalities. In 1976, how
ever, Congress eliminated such formalities as a prerequisite for copyright protection. See 1
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 3.0. As a result, since that date, this avenue for passage into the
public domain has been closed. See Landes & Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,
supra note 61 (suggesting a renewal requirement as a means of casting additional works into
the public domain).
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domain's primary purpose is not to reduce the costs consumers pay for
copyrighted works or to serve as a repository for works that are not
worth protecting.168 Instead, its purpose is to serve as a rich repository
of material for subsequent authors to draw upon for their own works,
without concerns about infringement or securing licenses.169 Thus any
one can re-tell Shakespeare's classic story of two "star-cross'd lov
ers"170 in any form, without first seeking a license to do so. Similarly,
companies like Disney can mine the public domain for stories (as they
have repeatedly done, for example, with the Hunchback of Notre
Dame, Pocahontas, Hercules, Cinderella, The Little Mermaid), to re
tell and re-imagine into their own copyrighted works.
A number of scholars have focused a good deal of recent attention
on developing a richer concept of the public domain to serve as a
counterweight to the recent expansionist tendency of intellectual
property law.171 These scholars have been concerned about the appar
ent lack of any structural mechanisms to counterbalance such expan
sions. Accordingly, they have begun to work towards concretely ar
ticulating the benefits that derive from a robust public domain and the
harms associated with granting ever-stronger private rights over in168. See Litman, supra note 30, at 967-68.
169. See id. at 968 ( The public domain should be understood not as the realm of mate
rial that is undeserving of protection, but as a device that permits the rest of the system to
work by leaving the raw material of authorship available fo r authors to use.").
"

170. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO & JULIET, Prologue.
171. See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the
Public Domain, 52 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2002) (hereinafter Boyle, Enclosure]; Charlotte
Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Artifacts, Facilities, and Content: Information as a Common-Pool
Resource, 52 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2002); David Lange & Jennifer Lange Anderson,
Copyright, Fair Use and Transformative Critical Appropriation, 52 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming
2002); Pamela Samuelson, Digital Information, Digital Networks, and the Public Domain, 52
DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2002) (all papers available at http:l/www.law.duke.edu/
pd/papers.html); see also BOYLE, supra note 125, at 363; LESSIG, supra note 121; Keith Aoki,
Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual Property and the Public Do
main, 18 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 191 (1 994); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Com
mon Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 354 (1999); James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens,
Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1 415 (1992); Paul Heald, Reviving the
Rhetoric of the Public Interest: Choir Directors, Copy Machines, and New Arrangements of
Public Domain Music, 46 DUKE L.J. 241 (1996); Peter Jaszi, Goodbye to All That - A Re
luctant (and Perhaps Premature) Adieu to a Constitllfionally-Grounded Discourse of Public
Interest in Copyright Law, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 595 (1996); Netanel, supra note 107,
at 368; Patterson, Understanding, supra note 90, at 368 ("A major purpose of copyright . . . is
to protect the public domain, an idea that may be counter-intuitive, but is also irrefutable.");
Edward Samuels, The Public Domain in Copyright Law, 41 J. COPYRIGHT SOC Y U.S.A. 1 37
(1993). See generally Conference on the Public Domain, Duke University Law School (Nov.
9-11, 2001), available at http:/fwww.law.duke.edu/pd/papers.html (visited Sept. 20, 2002).
This rich body of recent literature draws from earlier works analyzing the value of the public
domain. See L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A
LAW OF USERS' RIGHTS (1991); Gordon, supra note 116, at 1562; Lange, supra note 30, at
147; Litman, supra note 30; see also KAPLAN, supra note 106; Ralph Brown Jr., Unification:
A Cheerful Requiem for Common Law Copyright, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1070 (1977).
'
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formation.172 According to these scholars, the eventual passage of
works into the public domain is an essential feature of our existing
copyright structure.173
What has been less widely acknowledged has been the way in
which works begin this passage from private to public even during the
term of protection. That is, certain copyrighted works can take on
more and more public character over time as they become more en
trenched in popular consciousness and culture.174 Consider, for exam
ple, the iconic status of Mickey Mouse. In the early days, the cultural
meaning attached to Mickey was probably not much more than the
meaning attached to other cartoon characters of the time. Over time,
however, Mickey has come to signify much more in our society and
become a target for recasting and a focal point for alternate mean
ings.175 In many ways, the public's claim on Mickey has increased over
time, even during its period of copyright protection.176 Many authors
have thoughtfully analyzed the extent to which certain images, sym
bols, and characters may be necessary for us to engage in dialogue
about popular culture and our surroundings.177 As time passes, works
begin the passage from pure products of creative expression to objects
that are part of our collective cultural history.
Or, to take a narrower doctrinal example, consider how such things
as stock characters or scenes a faire,178 which are generally not pro
tected by copyright law, come to attain that status. A work, character,
or scene might start out as pure expression but, over the passage of
time, start to resemble more closely a pure idea, a stock character, or a
stock scene as the public is exposed to it and as others build and

172. But see Landes & Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, supra note 61, at 11-16
(suggesting that there may be inefficiencies associated with public domain status).
173. See Netanel, supra note 107, at 368-69 (proposing a democratic approach to copy
right scope that "would hold that works should at some point become a part of our common
cultural heritage because they have considerable social value, not simply because of market
failure").
1 74. See Madow, supra note 160.
175. See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. de
nied, 439 U.S. 1 132 (1979) (rejecting defense of fair use for defendants who published a
bawdy adult comic book featuring Mickey Mouse).
176. An analog to this can be found in the trademark doctrine of genericism, where a
trademarked term can lose its trademark status if the public adopts the word for use as a
general term for the product (for example, escalator, thermos, aspirin). See Coombe, supra
note 160; Dreyfuss, supra note 160.
177. See Gordon, supra note 1 16. See generally supra note 160; Litman, supra note 30, at
1013-17 (describing the way in which certain works "seep" into common usage). But see 2
Goldstein, supra note 5, § 10.2.l(b) (discussing satire).
178. Scenes a faire are elements of a creative work that are necessary to express an un
derlying unprotectible idea, scene, or plot. See 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 2.3.2.2.
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elaborate upon it.179 The first person to write a scene involving a villain
tying a heroine to the train tracks180 or a story involving a hard-boiled
private detective might have created something that involved almost
pure expression. However, as others repeat and embellish these ideas,
they become stock scenes and characters, moving from expression to
wards idea, 1 8 1 from the realm of private protection toward the public
domain.
This view of the public claim on cultural works has been critiqued
by a number of commentators. For example, Jane Ginsburg has
sharply criticized the attempt by some commentators to shift the focus
of copyright away from authors and towards the audience.182 In par
ticular, she has objected to the threads of this literature that draw
heavily from post-modern and critical cultural theories, arguing that
they go too far in eliminating the author's privileged role in copyright
law. Similarly, Justin Hughes has analyzed audience interests and con
cluded that audiences also have an interest in the stability of the
meaning of cultural artifacts.183 That is, there may be audience mem
bers who would prefer more stable cultural artifacts, and making it too
easy for others to transform or adapt these works may undercut the
interests of these audience members. The argument that the public has
some claim on a work is thus not uncontroversial.
One need not, however, go so far as to eliminate or greatly reduce
consideration of authorial interests to recognize that these interests
may be affected by the passage of time. Similarly, recognition that
time may increase the public's claim on a work does not result in com
plete failure to consider the author's initial interests. Instead, one only
needs to recognize that both of these interests exist, and that the bal
ance between them is affected by the passage of time. In the initial
years, authorial interests are at their greatest. But over time, these in
terests wane and the public claim on the work increases. We may dif
fer over precisely when and where the balance shifts. But the proposal
179. See Litman, supra note 30, at 1016-17 ("Some aspects of works of authorship are
easily absorbed, and once we have absorbed them, we are likely to make them our own and
lose sight of their origins. Ideas, information, short phrases, simple plots, themes, stock
scenes, and utilitarian solutions to concrete problems all share this characteristic.").
180. Thanks to my colleague Alfred Yen for suggesting this example.
181. This Article has focused on fair use as the doctrinal avenue for considering time as
a factor in setting the scope of copyright protection. It is possible that time could have an
impact on other copyright doctrines as well, such as the idea/expression dichotomy and the
scenes a faire doctrine. For the purposes of this Article, however, I have focused on fair use
because, as demonstrated in the following section, it provides the easiest and clearest doc
trinal avenue for consideration of time-related interests.
182. See Jane Ginsburg, Authors and Users in Copyright, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y
U.S.A. 1 (1997).
183. See Hughes, Recoding, supra note 152; see also Kozinski, supra note 160, at 469;
Landes & Posner, Economic Analysis, supra note 107, at 14 (analyzing this phenomenon in
economic terms).
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in this Article requires, at bottom, simply recognition of this bal
ance.184
Given that this movement from purely private to public is a grad
ual one, it is a bit odd that copyright law does not expressly recognize
this in setting the scope of protection, but rather purports to provide
full protection up to the end of the copyright term, and then abruptly
none at all. Consideration of time in fair use analysis would have the
desirable result of permitting more extensive transformation, critique,
and re-use of copyrighted works over time. Although this interest has
admittedly not played as central a role in setting the copyright bal
ance, we might expect this interest to be more relevant as the copy
right term extends to keep many more works from falling into the
public domain. In any event, consideration of time would have the
beneficial effect of permitting the scope of such transformation, cri
tique, and re-use to vary over time.
C.

Rewarding Authors

The incentive· argument discussed above is by far the most impor
tant and influential justification for copyright under U.S. law. Thus,
the arguments above should be sufficient by themselves to give most
courts reason to adopt time as a factor in fair use. In recent years,
however, other noneconomic theories of copyright law have begun to
make inroads. Although they do not approach the incentive argument
in importance or influence, I will address them here at least briefly and
show that they too support the proposal.
The strongest of these alternative theories has been the "author
reward" argument. Based in part on the writings of John Locke, this
justification holds that copyright law is a reward for the creative labor
of authors.185 Unlike the incentive argument; the author reward argu
ment is not based on the idea that authors should be rewarded in or
der to provide greater benefits for society more generally. Rather, the
argument is that the authors have a moral claim to their creative
works, based on natural law. This argument often finds expression not
184. Thus, the proposal here is not necessarily inconsistent with Justin Hughes's obser
vation that some consumers may have an interest in the stable meaning of creative works.
See Hughes, Recoding, supra note 152. Rather, the proposal provides a mechanism for bal
ancing that interest, over time, with the countervailing interest in disrupting such stable
meanings. See Hughes, Fair Use, supra note 10.
1 85. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 285-302 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690); see also Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving to Own Intel
lectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 609 (1992-1993); Gordon, supra note 1 16; Justin
Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988); Alfred Yen, Re
storing the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517 (1990); R.
Anthony Reese, Note, Reflections on the Intellectual Commons: Two Perspectives on Copy
right Duration and Reversion, 47 STAN. L. REV. 707 (1995) (analyzing features of copyright
term under competing views of Lockean labor theory).
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only in specific judicial opinions and particular features of copyright
law, but also in common intuitions about fair treatment of authors and
creators. That this justification has force can clearly be seen from the
fact that copyright law fully protects works that would have been cre
ated even without any financial incentive, like research papers, per
sonal letters, and diary entries.186 Copyright legislation is often influ
enced by these moral claims from authors.187
The author reward justification has come under attack on a num
ber of grounds. In particular, to the extent that this argument is based
on the Lockean notion that all are entitled to the fruits of their own
labor, some have questioned whether Locke's famous sufficiency pro
viso188 is satisfied, that is, whether there is "enough and as good" for
others.189 After an author has asserted rights over a work, are there
"enough and as good" other works or ideas out there for others to
claim? Others have critiqued the author reward argument for the
practical reason that it appears to have few limiting principles.190 Re
ward to authors tells us little about how much protection is enough,
how much is too much, how much authors deserve.191 One could, for
example, use the author reward argument to justify perpetual copy
right ownership in the fruits of an author's labor.192
A number of scholars have responded to this last critique by find
ing ways to limit the potential reach of natural law, thereby rendering
it more useful as a practical justification for copyright law.193 One such
186. See, e.g., Yen, supra note 185.
1 87. See, e.g., Copyright Term, Film Labeling, and Film Preservation Legislation: Hear
ings on H.R. 989, H.R. 1248, and H.R. 1 734 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual
Prop. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 1 04th Cong. 233-36 (1995) (statement of Quincy
Jones); id. at 240 (prepared statement of Bob Dylan, songwriter); id. at 241-42 (prepared
statement of Don Henley).
188. See LOCKE, supra note 185, at 291.
189. Wendy Gordon has argued that in some cases, restrictions on the ability to build
upon certain very prominent types of works might violate Locke's sufficiency proviso. See
Gordon, supra note 1 16. That is, there may be a category of works that are so prominent,
important, and/or unique that they are necessary in order to express oneself intelligibly
about certain subjects and/or ideas. In such cases, giving an author the right to prevent uses
of such essential properties may not in fact leave "enough and as good" for others because
others might in fact be worse off than if the author had never created the work in the first
place. See id; Symposium, supra note 63, at 682 (comments by Wendy Gordon) (discussing
how this perspective would lead to a limited copyright term).
190. See BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4, at 142.
191. See Reese, supra note 185, at 712 (arguing that "libertarian Lockeanism" does not
clearly prescribe the scope of intellectual property rights).
1 92. Indeed, such arguments were advanced in support of perpetual copyright in Eng
land. Walterscheid, supra note 90, at 345-46; id. at 359 (recognizing that "if 'reward for gen
ius' is considered the more important rationale, then there is a pronounced tendency to
lengthen the term of patents and copyrights to better assure that the 'reward' will actually
occur"); see also Adam D. Moore, A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property, 21 HAMLINE
L. REV. 65, 101-04 (1997).
1 93. See Gordon, supra note 1 16; Litman, supra note 30; Yen, supra note 185.
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limit is based on the recognition that individuals are only entitled to
fruits of their labor that are adequately measurable and practically de-.
finable.194 This is based on the observation that creative labor is rarely
the product of a single author, working alone. Rather, authors take
ideas, thoughts, concepts, and observations from other authors and so
ciety at large as the raw material of their work.195 The final work is not
solely the product of one author's labor, but also of the labor of many
others. As a result, the rights of the author should properly be limited,
not absolute.196
These limits lend support to the idea of a limited copyright term.197
Difficulties in tracing the provenance of works can be expected to in
crease over time, thus imposing a limit on the ability to clearly define
the entitlement. To the extent that the author reward view is limited
by the need to define entitlements with at least some degree of preci
sion, this reward should wane as time and definitional problems in
crease. Moreover, this limitation recognizes that all authors generally
benefit from being able to build upon the ideas of others, and that
they all share an obligation of some kind to prior authors.198 Thus, the
eventual passage of an author's work into the public domain can be
seen as part of the bargain that the author strikes in creating a work
that inevitably builds upon the creative labor of those who have pre
ceded her.199 To the extent that an author herself has built upon the
labor of others before her, she has a moral obligation to similarly per
mit those coming after her to build upon ner labor. The idea is that
authors have a moral obligation to help replenish the public domain.200
194. See Yen, supra note 185.
195. See Gordon, supra note 1 16, at 1556; Litman, supra note 30, at 1007-08.
196. See BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4, at 142 ("The
appeal of the natural rights argument is also lessened by recognition of the contributions of
others to the author's or artist's work."); Symposium, supra note 63, at 677 (comments by
Wendy Gordon); Edwin Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31,
36-40 (1989); Litman, supra note 30, at 1011 ; Reese, supra note 185; Yen, supra note 185. A
variation of this idea, based on post-modern literary theory, suggests that authorship as a
concept should have less relevance today, and that the audience also has a strong claim to
providing meaning for the work. See, e.g. , Lange, supra note 160; see also Jaszi, supra note
1 15, at 457-63. But see Ginsburg, supra note 182.
197. Even those who support a more author-centric conception of copyright law were
troubled by the Sonny Bono Term Extension Act, insofar as the Act appeared to focus more
on rewarding copyright holders rather than the authors and their families. See Ginsburg, su
pra note 35, at 171; Patry, supra note 4; Patry, Failure, supra note 60
1 98. See Symposium, supra note 63, at 677 (comments by Wendy Gordon); Yen, supra
note 185.
199. See Symposium, supra note 63, at 683.
200. See Gordon, supra note 1 16, at 1557-58. Dawn Nunziato has developed this claim
more formally in analyzing the issue of "intergenerational justice" among authors. See Dawn
C. Nunziato, Justice Between A uthors, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 219 (2002). Nunziato applies a
rights-based, Rawlsian analysis to the issue , and argues that authors, behind a Rawlsian veil
of ignorance, would agree to limitations on the scope of their intellectual property rights,
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Again, these observations tell us little about how long to set the
term. They may suggest a limit imposed by time, but do little to indi
cate what that limit should be. Once again, however, a precise figure is
not necessary to support the broader argument that time should mat
ter. Once we accept the view that an author's moral claim to compen
sation should be limited and that a limit on the term of the copyright is
an appropriate mechanism for such a limitation, it also follows that the
longer a piece has been out, the weaker the author's moral claim to
compensation is. As time passes, difficulties in defining the scope of
the entitlement increase. Moreover, the longer the piece has been out,
the greater the chance that it has contributed to the stock of ideas to
which the original author owes a debt, and upon which other authors
will want to build.
In addition, the continuing success of a work many years after its
original creation may undercut the moral claim to reward in another
way. If copyright is seen as a reward for creative labor, then we might
ask to what extent the revenue generated by a work seventy years af
ter the author's death is directly the result of such labor. Indeed, it
may well be that the continued success of such a work owes less to the
original labor of the author, and more to the contributions of society
or the public more generally in imbuing that work with certain mean
ings.201 Again, take the case of Mickey Mouse. To what extent is the
continuing success of that work due to the original creative labor of
Mr. Walt Disney? Do we really believe that the relative success of
Mickey Mouse over other cartoon characters of the time is solely or
even primarily the result of better creative choices made by Mr.
Disney at the time?202 A strong argument exists that, the further we
move from the original creative act, the more likely it is that the con
tinuing success of the work is due to factors unrelated to the original
creative labor.203 Thus, we can expect the moral claim for reward to
wane over time.
A closely-related, though analytically separate, line of argument
focuses on the need to protect certain personality interests of authors.
This justification asserts that products of creative thought are pecu
liarly personal to the author and represent an expression of the indiincluding limitations based on duration. See also Landes & Posner, Economic Analysis, su
pra note 107.
201. See Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the A dvertising
Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1730 (1999) (making a similar point in the trademark context);
Madow, supra note 160.
202. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 1 74-75 (1974) (tomato
soup reductio argument).
203. See BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4, at 142 ("[T)he
compensation a person receives for his services often depends on fortuities having no rela
tion to the level or quality of his efforts."); Hettinger, supra note 196; Stewart Sterk, Rhetoric
and Realily in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1 197, 1237-38 (1996).
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vidual's self, which should be protected from certain types of harm.
Based in part on the writings of Hegel, and elaborated most effectively
by Margaret Radin, these arguments justify aspects of copyright pro
tection based on the personhood interests of the authors.204 Although
such arguments have generally been much more influential in
Continental copyright law, they have recently found limited expres
sion in the United States through the recognition of certain rights of
integrity and attribution for certain works of fine art.205 These new
enactments are designed not so much to protect the financial interests
of authors, as their interests in their reputations as artists.
Even if one accepts this argument as a basis for some form of copy
right protection, the impact of this argument wanes with the passage
of time. Such author interests are by definition peculiarly personal to
authors. Accordingly, it is difficult to see why such an interest should
survive the author's own lifetime, much less seventy years after her
death. Certainly, an author could feel personally or emotionally
harmed by distortions or mutilation of her work. But after her death,
it becomes difficult to see why such an interest should be respected.206
Indeed, U.S. copyright law recognizes very limited rights of integrity
and attribution only for the life of the author, and only for works that
are not generally meant for mass consumption.207 Furthermore, these
interests can become even more attenuated when copyright interests
have been transferred and are thus owned, not by the original author,
but by corporations or other entities, as is often the case over time.208
Hence, even under this view, the interests of the author wane, while
the corresponding interests of society increase, as time passes.209

204. See Lawrence Becker, Deserving to Own Intellectual Property, 68 CHl.-KENT L.
REV. 609, 619-20 (1993); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV.
957 (1982). But see Weinreb, supra note 125, at 1219.
205. See Visual Artists Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000).
206. See BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4, at 69-70. Note
that protection of personality interests, even to this extent, assumes individual authorship
and ownership. Many works may be owned by corporations, either under the work for hire
doctrine or through subsequent assignment of the copyright. See Bard & Kurlantzick, Mil
lennium, supra note 4, at 49 & n.87 (statistics suggesting that a large percentage of commer
cially-valuable copyrighted works are owned by corporations); Hettinger, supra note 196, at
45 (arguing that this undercuts the personhood argument).
207. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000) . Note that other personal interests in the area of tort
(for example, defamation) are similarly limited to the lifetime of the individual. See, e.g. ,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 560 (1976). But see CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (West
2003) (granting publicity rights to "deceased personalities.").
208. See Weinreb, supra note 125, at 1246 ("Even so, once the transfer has occurred, the
personality-based aspect of the author's right is substantially gone."). But see 17 U.S.C. §
106A (rights retained by author even if copyright transfe rred).
209. Accord Hughes, Fair Use, supra note 10.
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D. Political Economy A rguments
A final set of arguments in support of the proposal can be found in
pragmatic considerations relating to the manner in which copyright
law is made in the United States. It is widely accepted that copyright
legislation responds quite directly to the lobbying efforts of the copy
right industries.210 It is not hard to see why. A narrow group of inter
ests - namely the movie, music, publishing, and software industries stands to benefit from expansion of intellectual property protection.
They have the resources and incentives to lobby for such expansion in
Congress.211 By contrast, consumers individually are largely indifferent
to such expansions. Although they bear much of the cost of expan
sions, and such costs may be significant in the aggregate,212 each con
sumer bears only a miniscule share, spread out over time.213 Thus, as
public choice theorists predict,214 consumers do not band together in
sufficient numbers to oppose efforts by the copyright industries to ex
pand protection.215 The few interested groups that do have some focus
and resources - such as libraries and educational institutions - are
simply outgunned by the array of countervailing interests. Moreover,
to the extent that the interests of narrow, more focused groups are
taken into account, they are usually granted a narrow exemption or
privilege, leaving the broader expansion intact.216
210. See Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL
L. REV. 857 (1987); see also Bell, supra note 48, at 786 (arguing that the Copyright Act has
fallen into "statutory failure"); Denicola, supra note 127, at 1684; Litman, supra note 158, at
35; Merges & Reynolds, supra note 76, at 53-54; Netanel, supra note 9, at 67-70; William F.
Patry, Copyright and the Legislative Process: A Personal Perspective, 14 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 139, 1 41 (1996); Sterk, supra note 203, at 1 244.
·

211. See Landes & Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, supra note 61, at 11 (ana
lyzing such expenditures on l�bbying as rent seeking).
212. See Karjala, Statement, supra note 51; BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT
DURATION, supra note 4, 7 1-76, 1 76-77 (estimating costs).
213. But see Hatch, supra note 7, at 728 (arguing that costs are outweighed by incentive
and other benefits of extension); O'Rourke, supra note 106, at 174 (suggesting that the costs
may not be that great, given other doctrines such as fair use that mitigate the impact of the
extension).
214. See, e.g., J. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT
( 1962); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971); MAXWELL L.
STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY (1997); Dan
iel Farber & Philip Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Pilblic Choice, 65 TEXAS L. REV. 873
(1987); see also Frank Easterbrook, The State of Madison's Vision of the State: A Public
Choice Perspective, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1328 (1994); Jonathan Macey, Promoting Public
Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1 986).
215. See Boyle, Enclosure, supra note 171; James Boyle, Essay, A Politics of Intellectual
Property: Environmentalism for the Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 87 (1 997) [hereinafter Boyle, Envi
ronmentalism].
216. See Lemley, supra note 90, at 533; Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 33 ( 1994); see also, e.g., Digital Millenium Copyright Act
(DMCA), 17 U.S.C. §§ 120l(d)-(h) (2000); 1 7 U.S.C. §§ 108, 110, 1 1 1 , 1 19, 122 (2000) .
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The impact of this set of circumstances on the expansion of copy
right protection has been extensively documented. In the substantial
revision of the Act that occurred in 1976, the copyright industries were
expressly invited to participate in the crafting of the Act, in part due to
the complexity of the Act and the difficulty of balancing so many
competing interests.217 Thus, industry lobbyists had a strong hand in
setting the scope of protection. Moreover, the consistent expansion of
the copyright term through the 1960s and 70s, and most recently in the
Sonny Bono extension act, is a clear example of the political economy
of copyright protection at work.218 Despite opposition by many intel
lectual property scholars219 and public interest groups, and despite ex
tremely strong arguments against extension, Congress recently ex
tended the term and applied it retroactively, largely in response to
heavy lobbying pressure from the copyright industries. Given this, it is
difficult to see how repeated extension of the copyright term can be
effectively resisted. Existing copyright holders have powerful incen
tives to keep petitioning Congress for both prospective and retrospec
tive extensions of the copyright term.220 The public at large will remain
largely unresponsive.221
Indeed, one of the more pernicious and underappreciated effects
of the steady extension of the copyright term over the past thirty years
has been to condition the public to generally accept a world in which
cultural objects are owned. The copyright term is currently so long
that the only works passing into the public domain have been those
published before the 1920s, works that, while important, have com
paratively less impact on the public today.222 We have thus grown ac
customed to a world in which most of the cultural objects we encoun-

217. See Litman, supra note 210; Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technologi
cal Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275 (1989); Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and the
New Institutional Economics, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1857 (2000) (suggesting possible more be
nign "information transmission" explanation). But see Hatch, supra note 7; cf Hamilton, su
pra note 4 (positing a more complex relationship).
218. See Gifford, supra note 51, at 385-86 (detailing efforts of Disney to secure term ex
tension). Disney chairman Michael Eisner lobbied personally for the extension. See BARD &
KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4, at 216; Disney Lobbying for Copy
right Extension No Mickey Mouse Effort, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 17, 1998, at 22.
219. See Karjala, Statement, supra note 51.
220. Nor are these incentives only recent. See, e.g., Walterscheid, supra note 90, at 327
(detailing the practice of seeking extensions to existing patent monopolies in 18th century
England).
221. But see Merges, supra note 76, at 2237 (highlighting some cases where opposition
might arise because of a countervailing interest group, as in the case of proposed database
protection bills).
222. Notable exceptions include such public domain works as the character of Santa
Claus, the works of Shakespeare, and classical music, myths, and stories.
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ter on a daily basis are owned.223 As a result, we do not by and large
register losses to the public domain, since we have never truly realized
its full benefits.224 Indeed, the idea of Disney not owning Mickey
Mouse seems distinctly odd.225 Contrast this with the state of affairs
that existed when the initial copyright term was only fourteen years.
Then, the value of the public domain was much more concrete and
immediate, since valuable works would soon be in the public domain,
either through expiration of the term226 or through failure to comply
with statutory formalities such as notice (which have largely been
eliminated).227 Or, to take another example, consider the far shorter
term in patent law, where the benefit from expiring patents is not only
concrete, but an essential part of the patent bargain. Through the
gradual extension of the copyright term, the public has been made
even less sensitive to the value of the public domain, and accordingly,
will have even less of an incentive to resist term extension efforts.228
Because of the structural obstacles that limit Congress' ability to
equitably address the issue of term expansion, judicial action becomes
more attractive as a mechanism for ensuring that public-regarding
limits on copyright scope are imposed.229 In recognition of this, many
commentators have turned to the limits in the Constitution imposed
by the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment.230 However, such
challenges have significant limitations, as already discussed. The pro223. See COOMBE, supra note 1 60 (describing the intellectual property she encounters
during her daily commute).
224. See Travis, supra note 36, at 831 ("The public's reversionary interest in most
twentieth-century works is functionally non-existent.").
225. See Kozinski, supra note 1 60, at 467; Lessig, supra note 9, at 1069 ("The ordinary
person believes, as Disney's Michael Eisner does, that Mickey Mouse should be Disney's for
time immemorial. The ordinary person doesn't even notice the irony of perpetual protection
for Disney for Mickey, while Disney turns out The Hunchback ofNotre Dame (to the horror
of the Victor Hugo estate), or Pocahontas, or any number of stories that it can use to make
new work.").
226. In his Commentaries shortly after passage of the initial Copyright Act, Justice Story
wrote that short terms are beneficial because they "admit the people at large, after a short
interval, to the full possession and enjoyment of all writings and inventions without re
straint." 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF TliE UNITED STATES
§ 1 147 (Fred. B. Roghman & Co. 1991) (1833). By contrast, discussions about the value of
works passing into the public domain has, until recently, been much more muted.
227. See 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 3.0.
228. Note there have been recent efforts to change this. See, e.g., Boyle, Enclosure, su
pra note 171; Boyle, Environmentalism, supra note 215; Conference on the Public Domain,
Duke Law School (Nov. 9-1 1, 2001), at http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/ (last visited Sept. 20,
2002).
229. See Merges, supra note 217, at 1 875 ("In this view, courts are a necessary counter
weight to inevitable rent-seeking on the part of special interests who lobby Congress."); cf
Macey, supra note 214.
230. See sources cited supra note 90; see also Lemley, supra note 90, at 531 (describing
trend); Merges & Reynolds, supra note 76.
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posal in this Article provides a practical and effective alternative way
for courts to ameliorate some of the undesirable effects of copyright
expansion and inject some public-regarding values into copyright
scope over time.231 Considering time in fair use may be one of the few
remaining ways for such values to find expression.232 Courts may thus
be able to adjust the scope of protection to compensate for the in
crease in the term of protection.233
It may well be, of course, that courts are no more inclined than
Congress to inject public-regarding values into the scope of copyright
protection. Indeed, recent expansion of copyright and general intellec
tual property protection has not been the exclusive province of
Congress. Rather, many courts have expanded the scope of intellec
tual property protection on a number of fronts, through interpreta
tions of intellectual property statutes and other legal doctrines.234
Although these expansions cannot be explained by imbalances in
lobbying power, a number of commentators have suggested various
alternative reasons for this expansion. One possible explanation is the
rhetorical appeal of arguments based on the need to protect "property
rights," without adequate consideration of the potential costs of such
protection in the intellectual property context.235 Another possibility is
that, as in the market for legislation, the copyright industries are re
peat players in copyright litigation,236 and therefore are able to better
shape the law through selective lawsuits and selective settlements.237

231. It could be argued that courts should not be engaged in this kind of activity. I ad
dress this argument expressly below. See infra Section III.B.
232. See O'Rourke, supra note 106, at 173 (suggesting that "the Bono Act provides an
even clearer example of how courts can mitigate congressional errors by applying scope
defining doctrines").
233. See Landes & Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, supra note 61 (proposing
an alternative solution to this problem).
234. See, e.g., AT&T v. Excel Communications, 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999); State St.
Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (extending patent pro
tection to business methods); MAI Sys. v. Peak Computer, 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993);
eBay v. Bidder's Edge, 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
235. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75
TEXAS L. REV. 873 (1997) {book review) (critiquing this argument).
236. See Glynn S. Lunney Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private
Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 901 (2001); see also
Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Im
pulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 279 (1992) (noting that the interests of the broader community
are not always represented in the adversarial posture of litigation); Lange, supra note 30, at
176 (suggesting that courts appoint a guardian ad !item for the public domain, in cases in
volving new intellectual property interests).
237. Compare Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) (suit
brought against so-called computer "hackers"}, with Felten v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of
Am., No. 01-CV-2669 (D.N.J. Nov. 28, 2001) (declaratory judgment action brought by com
puter science professor).
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Be that as it may, there are reasons to believe that the proposal of
fered in this Article offers a better avenue for public-regarding values
to be expressed in the scope of protection. As developed in more de
tail below, the proposal does not require courts to do any more than
apply standard fair use analysis. It does not require any major change
in existing law. Moreover, the equitable balancing test provided by fair
use will provide courts with an easy way of injecting such values in an
incremental, case-by-case manner, rather than by adopting a binding
interpretation of a statutory provision or striking down a statute en
tirely. Although the effect of such a change might be less dramatic, it
may well be easier to achieve and will have significant beneficial ef
fects over the long run. Finally, the courts certainly provide an alterna
tive avenue for lawmaking that is comparatively more shielded from
the lobbying pressure of the copyright industries, and thus more able
to respond receptively to appeals to the public interest.238
III.

DOCTRINAL ARGUMENTS

The arguments above establish that there are extremely strong rea
sons to consider the passage of time in determining the proper scope
of copyright protection. All of the existing justifications for copyright
law support the view that copyright protection should vary over time.
Indeed, after consideration of the above arguments, it seems particu
larly odd that courts do not consider time. Given the extreme length of
the current copyright term and the extent to which markets and incen
tives change over such a long time period, a copyright scope that is
static and fails to consider the passage of time seems highly artificial.
What follows, then, is an examination of the doctrinal case for con
sidering time. That is, given that strong policy reasons exist to consider
time in copyright law, is there doctrinal support for such a considera
tion? The answer is a surprisingly strong yes. Indeed, the fair use de
fense seems tailor-made for such a consideration, and in this section I
develop the doctrinal argument, based on the text and legislative his
tory of the Copyright Act as well as case law. I then address a particu
lar doctrinal argument resulting from the recent term extension.
A.

Text, Legislative History, Case Law

In building the doctrinal case for this proposal, it is important to
note at the outset that the fair use defense was created by the courts,
not by Congress.239 The 1909 Act (and all of the preceding copyright
acts) nowhere mentioned a defense of fair use. Rather, the early acts
238. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING I NSTITUTIONS IN
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POBLIC POLICY ( 1994).
239. 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 10.1, at 10:2.
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defined the rights of copyright owners and presumed that infringe
ment followed upon violation of these enumerated rights. Courts, in
applying the 1909 Act, created the fair use defense out of whole cloth,
viewing it as necessary to support the overall purpose of the Act: the
creation and broad dissemination of creative works.240 Thus, the courts
fashioned and developed the fair use defense over time, permitting use
of a work for various educational, critical, and other purposes, even
though such uses infringed the literal terms of the statute. In 1976,
Congress finally approved this line of judicial activism and codified the
defense in § 107 of the current Copyright Act.241
Congress's codification of fair use, however, reflected the judicial
origins of the defense and left the courts with broad discretion to con
tinue to apply it in a flexible manner. The House Report to the 1976
Act stated:
The statement of the fair use doctrine in section 107 offers some guid
ance to users in determining when the principles of the doctrine apply.
However, the endless variety of situations and combinations of circum
stances that can rise in particular cases precludes the formulation of ex
act rules in the statute. The bill endorses the purpose and general scope
of the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to freeze
the doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technologi
cal change. Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is

and some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt
the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis.242

Thus, Congress expressly contemplated that fair use would remain a
flexible doctrine that judges could freely adapt to meet changing cir
cumstances.243
The text of the fair use defense reflects this orientation toward
flexibility and adaptability, setting forth a number of nonexclusive fac-·
tors that a court should consider in making the case-by-case determi
nation of fair use:
§ 107. Limitations on exclusive rights: fair use.
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of
a copyrighted work . . . fo r purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any par
ticular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include -

240. The earliest articulation of the fair use defense in U.S. law is generally considered
to be Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (Story, J.).
241. 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 10.1, at 10:2.
242. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976) (emphasis added).
243. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (fair use doctrine " 'permits [and
requires] courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it
would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster' ") (citations omitted); 2
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 10.1.4, at 10:11.
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(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature . . .

(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and

(4)

the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the

copyrighted work . . . .

Note that the text, as suggested by the legislative history, sets forth
various factors and purposes, but does not purport to make them ex
clusive. Instead, courts are expected to continue to apply fair use in a
flexible manner.244
A court could, consistent with the text of the Act, properly con
sider time in at least two places. First, a court could consider the pas
sage of time under the second fair use factor, the nature of the copy
righted work.245 Courts have, in considering this factor, generally
focused on whether the work was creative as opposed to factual, and
whether it was published or not.246 As a general matter, creative or un
published works are accorded greater protection than factual or pub
lished works.247 Nothing in the text of the statute, however, prevents a
court from also considering the age of the work, since this is certainly
a part of its "nature." Indeed, courts - including the Supreme Court
- have considered other aspects of a copyrighted work besides the
two most common factors in analyzing the nature of the work.248 A
court could thus, in assessing the "nature" of a copyrighted work, con
sider the age of the work and thus incorporate this consideration into
the fair use analysis.
Second, a court could consider time independently as a separate
and distinct factor. It is clear from both the text of the statute and the
legislative history that the factors in § 107 are not exclusive. The text
244. This delegation of authority from Congress gives courts a significant role in deter
mining the practical scope of copyright protection. See 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5.
245. See, e.g., Note, supra pote 10, at 1212 (proposing that courts deciding cases involv
ing the re-writing of another author's copyrighted work consider time in the second fair use
factor).
246. See Harper & Row Pub., Inc. v. Nation Enterp., 471 U.S. 539, 551 (1985); 2
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 10.2.2, at 10:48.
247. See 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 10.2.2.2, at 10:48-10:49. But see William Landes,
Copyright Protection of Letters, Diaries, and Other Unpublished Works: An Economic Ap
proach, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 79 (1992) (arguing that unpublished works should have same
level of protection as published works, in some circumstances).
248. See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 449-50 (1984) (of
fe red to the public for free); Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc. 964 F.2d 965,
971 (9th Cir. 1992) (underlying work already sold). Indeed, the Supreme Court in Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994), implicitly recognized that the public nature of
a work might be relevant in certain fair use cases. See id. at 586 (noting that this factor "is
not much help in this case, or ever likely to help much in separating the fair use sheep from
the infringing goats in a parody case, since parodies almost invariably copy publicly known,
expressive works").
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expressly states that the factors to be considered "shall include," and
nowhere suggests that these factors are an exclusive list. Indeed, the
legislative history behind the Act clearly establishes that Congress
meant to give courts broad discretion to consider additional factors
not on the list.249 A later House Report, explaining the language in the
statute stated:
The Committee was concerned that as introduced, [the original lan
guage] might have been inadvertently construed to discourage courts
from looking at additional factors. The phrase "all the above factors" is
intended to encompass the terms "including" and "such as" embodied in
the preamble to Section 107, terms that are defined in Section 101 of title

17 as being "illustrative and not limitative." Thus . . . the courts must con
sider all four statutory factors, but they may, at their discretion, consider
any other factors they deem relevant. 250

Courts have, over the years, taken Congress up on this grant of
discretion, considering various factors not included in the list.251 These
additional factors have included: the bad faith of the defendant (re
sulting in a narrower scope of fair use),252 acceptance of public funds
by the author in creating the work (resulting in a broader scope of fair
use),253 and industry custom.254 Thus, courts could, consistent with the
text, legislative history, and case law, consider time as an additional,
independent factor in fair use analysis.255

249. See 4 MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.0S[A],
at 13-153 (2001) ("[T]he factors contained in Section 107 are merely by way of example, and
are not an exhaustive enumeration. This means that factors other than those enumerated
may prove to have a bearing upon the determination of f air use."); see also Harper & Row,
471 U.S. at 570; Castle Rock Enter., Inc. v. Carol Pub. Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir.
1998); Sega Enterp. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1522 (9th Cir. 1992); Maxtone
Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1260 (2d Cir. 1986).
250. H.R. REP. No. 102-836, at 9-10 (1992) (emphasis added).
251. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562-63; Brewer v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 749 F.2d
527, 529 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Section 107 sets forth four nonexclusive factors."); DC Comics Inc.
v. Unlimited Monkey Business, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110, 119 n.2 (N.D. Ga. 1984) ("Section 107
does not limit a court to consideration of only the four factors enumerated in the Statute.");
2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 10.2, at 10:18. See generally Saul Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of
Copyright, ASCAP COPYRIGHT LAW SYMPOSIUM No. 6, at 43 (1955).
252. See, e.g., Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir.
1992); Haberman v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 201, 214 (D. Mass. 1986); Roy Ex
port Co. Establishment of Vaduz, Liechtenstein, Black Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc., 503
F. Supp. 1137, 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir.); cf Harper & Row, 471
U.S. at 562-63.
.

253. See, e.g., Wojnarowicz v. Am Family Ass'n., 745 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
.

254. See, e.g., Triangle Pubs., Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers,
Inc., 626 F.2d 1171,
.
1176 (5th Cir. 1980).
255. Justin Hughes's proposal, by contrast, would fold consideration of time into the
fourth fair use factor - the impact of the use on the potential market - by having courts
look at how much longer the work will remain protected. See Hughes, Fair Use, supra note
10.
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In the end, then, the doctrinal argument in support of the proposal
is remarkably simple and clear-cut. The text, legislative history, and
case law on fair use clearly authorize courts to consider time, whether
as part of the second factor or as an independent factor. The only real
question is whether a court, in exercising its delegated discretion to
consider time in fair use analysis, feels that such a consideration is
warranted or desirable. As demonstrated in the previous part of this
Article, very strong policy considerations support considering time as
a factor in fair use analysis. This should provide courts with ample in
centive to factor this into the consideration of fair use.
Indeed, considering time as a factor in fair use would not require
courts to depart dramatically from existing practice - courts already
implicitly consider time in some fair use cases because a number of the
existing fair use factors are influenced by the passage of time.256 For
example, the unpublished status of a copyrighted work, which is rele
vant in assessing the second factor (the nature of the work), will of
ten257 be correlated with the age of the work. The Supreme Court case
Harper & Row v. Nation,258 for example, involved a magazine's publi
cation of as-yet-unpublished excerpts from former president Gerald
Ford's biography. In that case, the Court clearly recognized that the
age of the work had an impact on the various policy justifications fac
toring into the fair use analysis.259 Other cases involving unpublished
works address similar considerations.260
Similarly, the fourth factor, the potential impact on the market, is
often influenced by the passage of time. The younger the work, the
greater potential there is for a market to be affected by a particular
use. Conversely, the older the work, the less likely a market might be
affected, particularly if the work is no longer being fully exploited or a
license is difficult to secure.261 For example, copying an excerpt of an
old, out-of-print book is unlikely to result in any appreciable harm to
the market for that book.262 Thus, in many cases, the age of a work
256. See O'Rourke, supra note 106, at 174 ("Moreover, at least some of these doctrines,
particularly fair use, tend to be time-sensitive, allowing more use of information if relevant
market indicators demonstrate that competition would be enhanced by permitting certain
uses to proceed.").
257. In some cases, a work might be unpublished for quite some time after creation. For
example, a historical figure's private letters might be published many years after that figure's
death. Thus, unpublished status is not perfectly correlated with time.
258. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
259. Id. at 554-55.
260. See generally 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 10.2.2.2(b).
261. See Robert Kreiss, Accessibility and Commercialization in Copyright Theory, 43
UCLA L. REV. 1 , 72-73 (1995) (arguing for greater scope of privilege to copy out-of-print
books).
262. Consideration of time is thus also consistent with the market-failure justification
for fair use, see Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
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may be reflected in analysis of the market harm factor. True, this will
not always be the case. For example, if a work is still being actively
exploited late in its term (as is the case with, for example; Mickey
Mouse), then time may not correlate with harm to the market. For
every such case, however, there are many other cases where the cor
relation will exist.
The broader point is that express consideration of time would not
be a dramatic departure from existing practice because courts already
implicitly consider time in fair use analysis in some cases. It could be
argued that, if courts already consider time in fair use analysis, there is
no need for courts to consider time expressly. I address this argument
in more detail in the last section of this Article, which deals with an
ticipated objections to the proposal.263 For present p,urposes, let me
simply note that the values supporting consideration of time are not
always captured in the existing fair use analysis. Moreover, there are
substantial additional advantages to considering time more expressly.
The main point I wish to make here is simply that courts are already
implicitly considering time in some fair use analysis, and that the pro
posal in this Article would thus not be an unduly dramatic change.
Finally, not only is consideration of time fully authorized by the
statute, legislative history, and case law; it is also consistent with the
underlying policy justifications supporting fair use. Conventionally,
two main theories have been advanced to explain the role fair use
plays in copyright law: the public benefit theory and the market failure
theory. Under the public benefit theory, fair use is justified by the
broader societal goal of promoting substantive values such as critique,
research, education, and dissemination of knowledge.264 Under this
theory, older works should generally be subject to greater fair use,
since such works are more likely to form a part of our common cul
tural heritage and be desirable subjects of research, critique, and
study.265 Thus, broad fair use for older works supports these substan
tive goals underlying fair use.266
The proposal here is also consistent with the market-failure justifi
cation for fair use.267 Under this justification, fair use should be permitAnalysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1620 (1982),
since, as already discussed above, transactions costs can be expected to increase as time
passes.
263. See infra Section IV.B.
264. See 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 10.1.2.
265. See BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4, at 59 ("Facili
tation of the copying of old works, such as literary writings or recordings, is particularly im
portant, though, for an old work which someone wishes to duplicate is likely to be of unique
merit or to be needed for research or education, socially valuable activities.").
266. Accord Hughes, Fair Use, supra note 10.
267. See 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 10.1.1 (calling this the "private benefit" ap
proach); Gordon, supra note 262.
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ted for certain small-scale uses of works when the costs of obtaining a
license for such use exceeds the value of that use (e.g. photocopying a
single article or quoting a single phrase).268 Under this theory, fair use
is a response to market failure. As already pointed out above, we can
expect transactions costs to rise (and the market, therefore, to fail
more frequently) as a work gets older.269 Conversely, where a work is
comparatively younger, it will be relatively easy to identify the copy
right owner and negotiate a license. Thus, consideration of time is
broadly consistent (though again, not perfectly so) with this alternate
justification for fair use.
At the end of the day, the doctrinal argument in support of the
proposal is remarkably strong. The copyright statute, legislative his
tory, case law, and primary theories supporting the fair use doctrine all
provide strong support for courts to consider time as a factor in fair
use analysis. This strong doctrinal support, combined with the ex
tremely strong policy arguments, should provide courts with all the
reasons they need to consider time as a factor in fair use analysis.
B.

Dealing With Sonny Bono

One doctrinal counter-argument to the proposal could be based on
Congress's enactment of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act (the "Bono Act").270 The argument would look something like
this. Congress recently extended the term of copyright protection by
an additional twenty years. In so doing, Congress expressly found that
the incentive from an additional twenty years was justified for various
reasons, including the increased useful life of works in the digital age
and the need to harmonize U.S. and European copyright law. By tak
ing time into account in fair use analysis and effectively reducing the
scope of protection over time, courts would be frustrating this legisla
tive intent. Thus, courts cannot, consistent with the recent term exten
sion, consider time as a factor in fair use analysis.
This argument is weak on a number of fronts. First, the argument
finds no support as a matter of statutory interpretation. The plain text
of the term extension says nothing at all about fair use and what courts
should consider in fair use analysis.271 Its limited and focused purpose
is to extend the term by an additional twenty years, and consideration
of time in fair use analysis is in no way inconsistent with the plain
terms of the extension. Thus, the plain meaning of the extension does

268. See Gordon, supra note 262.
269. See supra Section II.A. But see Bell, supra note 114, at 586 (suggesting that the
Internet may reduce transaction costs on-line and thus lead to a narrower scope of fair use).
270. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998), amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-304.
271. See id.
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not foreclose consideration of time. Second, no specific intent of
Congress would be frustrated by consideration of time in fair use. That
is, Congress did not, in passing the extension, specifically intend that
courts should refuse to consider time or freeze the scope of fair use.
This is not surprising, since courts have thus far not explicitly consid
ered time in their fair use analysis. Thus, Congress could not have an
ticipated or had any specific intention about such practice.
Third, the more general intent of Congress to extend the term
would not be frustrated by interpreting fair use to incorporate consid
eration of time. In enacting the extension, Congress did not intend to
shrink or freeze the scope of fair use or limit the considerations avail
able to courts under section 107. Rather, Congress intended merely to
extend protection - whatever the substantive scope of that protection
- another twenty years.272 Considering time as a factor in fair use
analysis thus does not conflict with the extension of the term, because
it only affects the scope, not the duration of the copyright. Authors
will still be entitled to an additional twenty years of copyright protec
tion. However, that additional twenty years will, like any other twenty
year period of the copyright term, be subject to whatever limitations
courts allow under the fair use defense.
True, it would clearly be inconsistent with the intent and policy of
the Act if a court expressly deprived an author of all protection for the
additional twenty-year period. And if this proposal aimed to accom
plish the same goal, albeit not explicitly, then a strong argument could
be made that the intent of Congress was being frustrated. However,
the proposal here does not deprive authors of all protection for the ex
tension period. Indeed, authors will still have a great degree of protec
tion.273 They will still have full rights during that period to prevent
copying, public distribution, public display, public performance, and
the creation of derivative works. Like rights during the term more
generally such rights will simply, be subject to limitation by fair use.
Nor, as developed in more detail below, is the proposal even targeted
expressly at the extension term. Rather, the proposari s a change in the
scope of fair use that would apply over the entire length of the copy
right term and might even result in increased protection earlier in a
copyright's term. The proposal is truly aimed more at scope rather
than duration, and it is not in any way inconsistent with Congress's in
tent in enacting the Bono Act.274

272. See H.R. REP. No. 105-452 (1998).
273. The Sonny Bono Act does include an exception to infringement for libraries during
the extension period, "for purposes of preservation, scholarship, or research," under certain
circumstances. 17 U.S.C. § 108(2)(h)(l).
274. See Garon, supra note 36, at 600 (suggesting that Congress either repeal the exten
sion or modify the extension so that protection is more limited during the extension period).
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Finally, even if there were some modest amount of tension with
congressional intent, good reasons exist for interpreting the Bono Act
narrowly and not extending its preemptive effect beyond the literal
words of the enactment itself. A number of commentators analyzing
theories of statutory interpretation have suggested that courts should
subject statutes to narrower construction when the statutes result from
systemic or structural imbalances in lobbying power.275 Under this
view, courts engaging in interpretation have a role in policing the leg
islative process, to check such imbalances and to ensure that public
regarding values. are represented. As described above, the Bono Act
bears all of the hallmarks of a statute enacted largely in response to
unequal lobbying power.276 Accordingly, under this interpretive view,
the scope of the extension should not be read more broadly than nec
essary.277
This view is, naturally, not uncontroversial. Others have argued
that legislation represents little more than the bargain struck by com
peting interest groups lobbying for legislation, and the role of the
courts is to enforce this bargain.278 Thus, courts should try to effectuate
the intent of the parties to the agreement and refrain from any inter
pretation of statutes that would frustrate this intent. Under this view,
the injection of public-regarding values from outside the legislative
bargain struck by competing lobbying groups would be an illegitimate
exercise ·of judicial power. Applied to the proposal in this Article, the
argument would be that the Bono Act should be interpreted to bar the
proposal, since the parties who lobbied for the extension clearly ex-

275. See, e.g., DANIEL FARBER & PHILIP FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 131 (1991); see also WILLIAM ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL.,
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 81-90 (2000); William Eskridge, Jr., Poli
tics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statlltory Interpretation, 74
VA. L. REV. 275, 303-05 (1988); Macey, supra note 214, at 224; Netanel, supra note 9, at 66
n.278; Cass Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405,
471 (1989). The same argument has been made in support of calls for the courts to strike
down such laws as unconstitutional. See Merges, supra note 76, at 2238-39 ("I am only argu
ing that, when an imbalance is clear, courts ought to treat it as relevant. In a close case,
where a statute seems close to a line drawn by the Constitution, it should be relevant that
only industry groups were represented during the drafting of the statute. Not determinative;
but relevant. A copyright term incapable of serving as an incentive at any plausible discount
rate . . . in these and similar cases, an inquiry into the legislative process seems a relevant
consideration. In a close case, that inquiry should tip the balance."); Merges & Reynolds,
supra note 76, at 59.
276. See BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4, at 215-20;
supra Section 11.D.
277. See Merges, supra note 76, at 2238; O'Rourke, supra note 106, at 169 (arguing that
courts interpreting intellectual property statutes can play a role in compensating for imper
fectio?s in the legislative process).
278. See Easterbrook, supra note 214, 1346-47; Einer Elhauge, Does Interest Group
Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial. Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 48-59 (1991); Robert
Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA . L. REV. 339, 345-47 (1988).
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pected and intended for the additional twenty years ·of protection to
be full and unaffected by the passage of time.
A lengthy discussion of this debate is beyond the scope of this
Article. Suffice it to say that I find generally more persuasive the in
terpretive stance adopted by the commentators arguing for stricter
scrutiny of statutes resulting from systematic imbalances in lobbying
power. Although one must certainly be careful to distinguish cases
where such imbalances are systematic from cases where imbalances
are simply part of the regular political process, the evidence suggests
that the recent extension of copyright protection is not a case that is
close to the line.279 In any event, even under the interest-group bargain
theory there is little evidence that Congress had any specific or general
intent regarding the scope of copyright protection, and certainly such
an interpretation is not found anywhere in the text of the bargain.
Finally, no real tension exists between Congressional intent (of what
ever kind) and this proposal, since the proposal in this Article deals
with the scope of copyright protection, not its duration.
N. THE PROPOSAL INDETAIL

Having constructed both the theoretical and doctrinal arguments
in support of the proposal, I now turn to the specifics of the proposal.
The proposal itself is easy to state: courts should consider time as a
factor in fair use analysis. What remains is an elaboration of what the
proposal means and what sorts of concrete results would follow from
its adoption. In particular, how might copyright law be different if we
adopted this proposal? As the analysis below will show, consideration
of time would improve fair use analysis by permitting courts to tailor
the defense more closely to the justifications underlying copyright law
generally.
A. Some Examples
As described above, the most straightforward manner of incorpo
rating time as a factor in fair use analysis would be to consider time
expressly as one of the many independent factors in fair use analysis.
Since each of the factors contributes to the totality of the circum
stances used to evaluate whether a use is "fair," time would not be
dispositive in and of itself.280 Rather, a court would still consider all of
the factors in fair use analysis, and consideration of time would simply
be folded into the broader analysis. At the same time, the impact of
279. See supra Section 11.D.
280. See, e.g., Note, supra note 10, at 1213 (making similar point with respect to proposal
that courts consider time in deciding cases involving the re-writing of another author's copy
righted work).
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time on fair use would not be trivial. Indeed, consideration of time
would greatly increase the scope of fair use at the end of the copyright
term and perhaps decrease the scope of such use at the beginning of
the term.
1.

Transformative Uses

Some examples will help clarify how time might affect the scope of
fair use. Take the recent, much-cited dispute involving publication of
the book The Wind Done Gone.281 In The Wind Done Gone, the
author, Alice Randall, created a fictional work based on Margaret
Mitchell's Gone With the Wind.282 Randall re-told aspects of the story
from the perspective of a woman named Cyanara, the daughter of a
slave living on the plantation. Randall intended for the book to serve
as a critique of Gone With the Wind's depiction of slavery in the Civil
War era.283 In so doing, she appropriated many characters (such as
Scarlett O'Hara, Rhett Butler, Ashley Wilkes, and Mammy),284 the
general plot, some dialogue, and major scenes from Gone With the
Wind.285

Upon learning of the book, the trustees of the Margaret Mitchell
trust sued Randall for copyright infringement. The federal district
court ruled in favor of the trust, enjoining publication of the work.286 In
reaching this result, the court rejected Randall's fair use argument,
primarily based upon the commercial nature of the new work and the
impact on the potential market for sequels or other versions of Gone
With the Wind.287 This decision, however, was reversed on appeal,288
the appellate court holding that Randall's fair use defense was likely
to succeed and so publication of her work should not be enjoined.289 In
281. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). This spe·
cific example has been developed in Note, supra note 10, at 1193. It also has been a popular
example in much recent copyright literature. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 121, at 198-99;
Netanel, supra note 9; Note, supra note 10; Note, supra note 165.
282. MARGARET MITCHELL, GONE WITH THE WIND (1936).
283. For a similar situation involving a re-telling of Vladimir Nabokov's Lolita, see
Peter Applebome, Pact Reached on U.S. Edition of "Lolita" Retelling, N.Y. TIMES, June 17,
1999, at El.
284. These characters were in many cases re-named, although clearly with refe rence to
the original (e.g. Rhett Butler was renamed R.B., etc.). Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1267.
285. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1368-69 (N.D. Ga.
2001), vacated by 252 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2001).
286. Suntrust Bank, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1 386.
287. Id. at 1379, 1 382.
288. Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
289. The appellate court initially vacated the injunction on the grounds that it repre
sented an unconstitutional prior restraint. Suntrust Bank, 252 F.3d. at 1166. It subsequently
supplemented its initial order with a more comprehensive opinion on the substantive copy
right issue. Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1259.
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applying the traditional four factors of the fair use test, the court held
that the use was clearly transformative because it sought to parody
and critique the original, and that there was insufficient evidence to
support a finding that the market for Gone With the Wind or any de
rivative works would be harmed by Randall's use.290
Consideration of time as a factor in this case would have made the
ultimate outcome easier to reach.291 A court considering time would
have noted that the original Gone With the Wind was published in
1936, and was nearing the end of its copyright term.292 This means that
Margaret Mitchell and her estate had already had more than sixty
years of exclusive right to sell the original work, to authorize new ver
sions, and to exploit it through derivative works such as movies293 and
sequels.294 By any measure, both Mitchell and the estate had been am
ply compensated for the work.295 At the same time, Gone With the
Wind has, over time, achieved a prominence in our culture that makes
it a desirable target for re-invention and re-telling. Indeed, the book is
one of the best-selling works of all time, second only to the Bible.296
Accordingly, the scope of permissible transformative re-telling should
be much greater now, more than sixty years after original publication.
Of course, consideration of time would need to be weighed along
with the other fair use factors. Thus, in this case, time would merely be
another factor weighing in favor of fair use, along with the transforma
tive nature of the use. Combined with the other factors, consideration
of time would have reinforced the ultimate outcome. On the other
hand, one could imagine a different set of facts under which time
would not be sufficient to lead to a finding of fair use. For example,
say the case had involved the defendant selling exact, unauthorized
copies of the original novel. The age of this work would still support a
finding of fair use, but would be outweighed by the other four factors
that would all point against fair use. Thus, time would not by itself be
dispositive, though it would affect the analysis.

290. Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1267-76.
291. See Note, supra note 10, at 1211-12.
292. The court in Suntrust Bank briefly noted that Gone With the Wind was approaching
the end of its copyright term, but only in mentioning that future derivative works would only
be protected as to their original contributions, and that elements drawn from the underlying
work would pass into the public domain. Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1275.
293. See GONE WITH THE WIND (Metro-Goldwyn Mayer 1939).
294. See ALEXANDRA RIPLEY, SCARLETT: THE SEQUEL TO MARGARET MITCHELL'S
GONE WITH THE WIND (1992).
295. See Note, supra note 10, at 1211-12 (noting that the novel "has sold tens of millions
of copies, and was made into a film that, in inflation-adjusted dollars, is the highest-grossing
movie of all time.").
296. See Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1259.
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Consideration of time as a factor might also mean more protection
in the initial years of a work's life . That is, including time in the fair
use calculus does not necessarily result in less overall protection for
copyrighted works. Indeed, it might mean even more protection in the
initial years of a work, when the value of such protection is greatest.
For example, imagine the same set of facts in the Wind Done Gone
case, but applied to the most recent Harry Potter novel.297 Say an
author decides to publish his own version of a Harry Potter novel, but
from the perspective of one of the minor characters in the book. And
suppose that this perspective is a critical one, highlighting certain un
desirable assumptions underlying the book.
Even though the facts might be nearly identical to those in the
Wind Done Gone case, considering time as a factor could lead a court
to find no fair use. Here, the work would have only been published for
a couple of years. Accordingly, the potential impact on creative incen
tives is much greater. The original author would not have had signifi
cant time to exploit the work commercially298 or to fully realize the ar
tistic vision underlying it.299 Moreover, the interest in controlling
derivative works is much stronger, since licensing derivatives takes
both time and effort, and only a short period of time has passed.300
And even though the Harry Potter books have garnered much atten
tion, they have not yet attained iconic stature nor embedded them
selves as firmly- into our cultural consciousness as Gone With the Wind.
Thus consideration of time could well lead to a different conclusion in
a case involving a younger work. At the same time, the exact same
facts occurring eighty years from now would likely lead to a different
result.
Or take another example: Mickey Mouse. In the late 1970s, Disney
sued the publishers of a counter-culture comic book, titled Air Pirates,
which depicted Mickey and Minnie Mouse engaging in drug-smuggling
and various unseemly activities.301 Although the court in that case held
that the comic book constituted a parody sufficient to trigger a possi
ble fair use defense, the court ultimately concluded that the use was
not fair, based upon a weighing of the four factors.302 If the court had
297. See Note, supra note 10, at 1213 (mentioning precisely this example and arguing
that this would be a closer case). The Harry Potter books themselves were the subject of a
copyright dispute. See Scholastic, Inc. v. Stouffer, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d 1035 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
298. See Lange & Anderson, supra note 171 (suggesting, for younger works, some kind
of "sharing" arrangement); Note, supra note 10, at 1212.
299. A number of much-anticipated sequels are on their way. Cf. Hughes, Recoding,
supra note 152, at 927 (arguing that consumers have an interest in having stable meanings).
300. See, e.g., Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 145-46 (2d
Cir. 1998).
301. See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
1 132 (1979).

U.S.

302. Id. at 758.
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considered time as a factor in the fair use analysis, the result might
well have been different. A court would have noted that Disney had
by that time enjoyed more than forty years of copyright protection for
Mickey Mouse,303 a significant time period within which to earn a re
turn and develop various sequels and other properties based on the
original creative work. Moreover, Mickey Mouse had attained a cer
tain status and cultural significance.304 This, weighed against the vari
ous other factors, could well have been sufficient to tip the case and
result in a finding for the defendants. By the same token, had the same
case arisen in the 1930s, shortly after the initial creation of the work,
the analysis suggested here might well have led to a different result.
Finally, consider an example of a derivative, but non-critical, use.
In Castle Rock Entertainment v. Carol Publishing,305 the owners of the
copyright in the popular television comedy Seinfeld sued an author for
publishing a book called The Seinfeld Aptitude Test, which contained
trivia questions about facts from the television sitcom. The Second
Circuit held that the book was a derivative work and rejected a fair
use argument.306 The rejection of the fair use defense was based in part
on the relatively well-established rule that, in assessing the harm to the
market, a court should look not only to the market for the work itself
(in this case the television show), but also the market for derivative
works (such as books based upon the television show).307 This consid
eration of the derivative market is supported by the idea that a copy
right owner should be given an opportunity to exploit the work
through licensing or the creation of derivative works. At the same
time, however, this right permits copyright holders to limit efforts by
others to build upon the work, raising concerns that the original
author may use this right to suppress or limit creative transformation.
Consideration of time in such derivative-works cases would permit
courts to vary the scope of this right over time and thereby achieve a
finer balance between these competing concerns. Thus, where the
work is older, noncritical derivative works should have freer rein,
since the copyright owner will have had ample opportunity to develop
such works on his or her own, and the work will be an attractive sub
ject for adaptation. Moreover, the incentive impact of finding less pro303. Actually, the air pirates parody of Mickey Mouse was based on a later version of
Mickey Mouse (with features differing somewhat from the original Steamboat Willie), so the
actual time period might be less than forty years.
304. See Gordon, supra note 114, at 1603; Jessica Litman, Mickey Mouse Emeritus:
Character Protection and the Public Domain, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 429, 434

(1994) ("[O]nce Mickey Mouse becomes a cultural icon, we need to be able to talk about
him, sometimes irreverently.").
305. 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998).
306.

Id. at 135

307.

Id. at 144-46.
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tection will be minimal. Where a work is relatively young, however,
the scope of such use would be comparatively less.308 Thus, considera
tion of time in the Seinfeld case would have lent additional support
toward a finding of no fair use, since the works are so new. However,
the exact same facts applied to an older work would probably reach a
different result. For example, a Gone With the Wind Aptitude Test,
employing the exact same format as the Seinfeld Aptitude Test, would
probably constitute fair use.309
Many other actual cases illustrate the same overall point: that con
sideration of time could change the results in a significant number of
fair use decisions. For example, recent fair use cases involving older
copyrighted works include claimed fair uses of the following works:
the movie character James Bond (who first appeared in film in
1962);310 the works of Scientology founder L. Ron Hubbard (written in
the 1950s);311 The Cat . in the Hat by Dr. Seuss (published in the
1950s);312 the Star Trek television series (first aired in 1966);313 the
Godzilla movies (created in 1954);314 and the films of Laurel and
Hardy (from 1929).315 In each of these cases, the age of the work would
have lent additional support to the fair use argument, and would likely
have changed the ultimate results in a number of them. These exam
ples illustrate how time would affect the scope of copyright protection
for older works.
In response to the above examples, it could be argued that the
proposal gets it exactly backwards by affording potentially more pro308. Note that this analysis does not say anything about whether the case was rightly
decided as an initial matter (particularly on the derivative work issue). Only that the relative
youth of the underlying work would have undercut the fair use argument. See Ginsburg,
supra note 154 (discussing these cases).
309. Or, for a concrete recent example, consider Toho Co. v. William Morrow & Co., 33
F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1217 (C.D. Cal. 1 998), which involved a book containing facts, pictures,
and plot summaries from the Godzilla movies, which were first shown in the 1 950s.
310. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 12991 301 (C.D. Cal. 1 995) (no fair use for commercial employing a James-Bond-like character,
where the first Bond film appeared in 1962).
3 1 1 . Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp.
1231, 1249 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (no fair use for posting the writings of L. Ron Hubbard, which
were written in the early 1950s).
312. Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1403 (9th Cir. 1997)
(no fair use of Dr. Seuss style to retell O.J. Simpson double-murder story, where Dr. Seuss
books first appeared in the 1 950s).
313. Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Publ'g Group, 1 1 F. Supp. 2d 329, 337 (S.D.N.Y.
1 998) (no fair use for Star Trek fan book called The Joy of Trek where television series first
appeared in 1 966).
314. Toho Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d at 1217 (no fair use for book containing facts, pictures,
and plot summaries from the Godzilla movies, where Godzilla created in 1954).
315. Richard Feiner & Co. v. H.R. Indus., Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 310, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1998),

vacated mem. 182 F.3d 901 (2d Cir. 1999) (no fair use for commercial use of colorized photo

of Laurel and Hardy, which was taken in 1 929).
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tection for younger works. That is, the ability to contest or challenge
the cultural meaning of a work through parody or transformation is
most important early in the life of a work, and insulating the work
from such early critique would unfairly silence or hinder competing
perspectives. Thus, for example, a parody of the Harry Potter books
or the Star Wars films might be most appropriate now, when these
works are prominent in the public consciousness. Limiting such trans
formative uses to the end of the copyright term risks permitting such
uses only when they are far less relevant.
As an initial matter, the proposal advanced here would not com
pletely insulate newer works from parody or critique. Time would only
be one of several factors in fair use analysis and could well be out
weighed in many cases (for example, where the use is particularly
transformative, and where the impact on the market is likely to be
minimal). As in all fair use cases, much would depend on the facts.
Thus parody would still be available for newer works and others
would still be permitted to contest the preferred meanings of new
works. The broader point, however, is that the scope of such use
would be comparatively less than that applied to older works.316
Moreover, such a result is not problematic once one acknowledges not
only the societal interest in different perspectives, but also the copy
right owner's interests in obtaining a return for her creative labor and
in further developing the artistic vision underlying the original work.
By altering the scope of protection over time, the proposal permits
these interests to be balanced in a more nuanced fashion.
Not only do the above examples, as argued earlier, fit both copy
right doctrine and theory, they also seem quite consistent with com
mon sense and our intuitions. Even given identical facts, it seems intui
tively right that the scope of fair use for Gone With the Wind should be
greater than the scope of fair use for Harry Potter. It seems intuitively
appropriate that the ability of third parties to re-cast, transform, and
adapt older works should generally be greater than the corresponding
right to re-cast newer works. The main difference between these two
examples is simply time and what time represents with respect to
many of the policy justifications underlying copyright law.
2.

Excerpts

Although the transformative uses discussed above probably pres
ent the strongest case in support of the proposal, nontransformative
uses would also benefit from consideration of time. Consider, for ex
ample, the use of excerpts from copyrighted works, that is, incorpo
rating quotes and passages, sometimes extensively, from other works.
316. For example, derivative works that are only minimally parodic might be more per
missible for older works and less so for newer ones.
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Under the proposal, the ability of subsequent authors to incorporate
excerpts from other works would be affected by the age of the work.
So, taking the facts from Harper & Row,3 1 7 the fact that the work was
new would have weighed against a finding of fair use. True, as already
discussed, the Court implicitly recognized the impact of time in its
general fair use analysis.318 Recognition of time would, however, have
been express under the proposal in this Article, thus providing an
easier route to the Court's ultimate result.319
At the same time, the result might well have been different under
this proposal if the case had arisen fifty years later. That is, assume
that a news magazine wished to reproduce the exact same quotes, not
to "scoop" the initial publication of the work, but as part of a histori
cal analysis of some of the events described in the memoir. With these
same facts, consideration of time would greatly support a finding of
fair use, since much ti�e would have passed since the original creation
of the work. True, application of standard fair use analysis might also
reach the same result. For example, the fourth factor in this case might
well flip to favor the defendant because licensing revenues from the
initial publication would not be an issue.320 However, other licensing
revenue would still be a concern. Thus, it is not entirely clear that the
result would be different under standard fair use analysis. Considera
tion of time, however, would likely lead to a different result.
Along these same lines, consideration of time could shed light on
the use of excerpts of unpublished letters and papers in subsequent
works. In a number of cases, courts have grappled with the fair use
status of excerpts of unpublished works in unauthorized biographies,
like the publication of personal letters in an unauthorized biography
of J.D. Salinger.321 As a general matter, courts have given significant
weight to the unpublished status of the work in rejecting claims of fair
use.322 This is in part out of the concern with financial incentives dis-

317. Harper & Row, Pub., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
318.

See id. at 551-55.

319. Of course, there could well be cases where excerpting is still justified even for new
works. For example, where an excerpt is necessary to comment on an issue that is particu
larly timely or newsworthy. Although the age of the work would tilt against fair use, other
considerations might well outweigh that factor.
320.

See Landes, supra note 247, at 111.

321. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987) (no fair use of excerpts
of private letters of J.D. Salinger in an unauthorized biography), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890
( 1987); see also New Era Publ'ns Int'! v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989) (no
fair use for unflattering biography of L. Ron. Hubbard which used excerpts from unpub
lished letters and diaries), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1094 (1990). But see Pub. L. No. 102-492, 106
Stat. 3145 (1992) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107). See generally Jon 0. Newman, Not the End of
History: The Second Circuit Struggles With Fair Use, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 12
(1989).
322.

See, e.g., Salinger, 811 F.2d at 95-99; 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 10.2.2.2(b).
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cussed above,323 but in part also out of an apparent concern with the
privacy interests of the individuals.324 Historians and other scholars
have expressed concern that these decisions might hinder their ability
to study and write about figures of historical interest.325
Consideration of time would provide .a way of balancing these
competing interests. In such cases, the unpublished status of a work
would continue to weigh against a finding of fair use, but the age of
the work would also factor into the analysis. Thus, where the unpub
lished work is relatively new, consideration of time would reinforce a
finding of no fair use. So, for example, there would be more limited
fair use of recent unpublished letters.326 However, where the unpub
lished work is older, consideration of time would weigh in favor of fair
use, counteracting the unpublished status of the work. Thus unpub
lished letters dating from the 1940s would be subject to greater fair use
than recent letters. Again, this result finds support in the general poli
cies underlying copyright law. When an unpublished letter or manu
script is new, the author's interests, whether financial or privacy
related, are generally the greatest. As the decades pass, these interests
wane, while the broader societal interest in studying, reporting, and
disseminating excerpts from these works increases. Again, time would
permit a more nuanced consideration of these underlying copyright
interests.
3.

Personal Uses

The examples above all involve the use of a work by a subsequent
author. The proposal in this Article, however, could also be applied to
personal uses by consumers as well. Examples of this type of use in
clude taping songs from a CD for use in one's car stereo (so-called
"space shifting"), taping on-air television broadcasts for later viewing
(so-called "time shifting"), and photocopying newspaper or magazine
articles for personal use or study. The same basic rules discussed
above would apply to these cases. Thus, where a work is relatively old,
courts would permit a greater degree of personal copying. Conversely,
where a work is new, courts would permit comparatively less freedom
for personal copying.

323.

See Landes, supra note 247, at 1 1 1 (analyzing economic interests).

324. See Jon 0. Newman,
VLA J.L. & ARTS 459 (1988).

Copyright Law and the Protection of Privacy, 12 COLUM.

325. See David Kaplan, The End of History?, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 25, 1989, at 80. See gen
erally Mary Sarah Bilder, The Shrinking Back: The Law of Biography, 43 STAN. L. REV. 299
(1991).

326. Again, this is a generalization. There might well be cases where such letters are so
newsworthy (for example, a private letter of a public government official concerning a mat
ter of public interest) that these factors are outweighed by the other fair use factors.
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Again, consideration of time would not by itself be dispositive.
Thus, the other factors might outweigh time or dictate the same result
whether time is considered or not. Indeed, since some of the uses may
already be privileged by the fair use defense or under other statutory
exemptions,327 consideration of time might not materially change the
results.328 For example, take the question of personal copying of televi
sion broadcasts for purposes of time-shifting, the issue raised in Sony
v. Universal City Studios.329 The proposal in this Article suggests that
the scope of fair use for such broadcasts should depend on the age of
the copyrighted work. , Thus, time-shifting of older shows from the
1950s would be subject to greater privilege than similar copying of
very recent shows. However, since the Supreme Court held in Sony
that time shifting in general is fair use, consideration of time would not
add anything to the analysis.330
In cases closer to the line, however, time would make more of a
difference. For example, consider private taping of on-air television
broadcasts, not for time-shifting, but instead for building up a home
library for repeat viewing. The Supreme Court in Sony expressly de
clined to rule on this issue,331 and the fair use status of this activity is
very much in question. Or consider personal taping of CDs borrowed
from friends for purposes of building up a collection. Time could well
make a difference in the fair use analysis. The ability to make personal
library copies of older works, say music from the 1930s {for example,
an old recording of a Cole Porter song) or classic television shows
from the 1950s (for example, the Honeymooners) or old magazine ar
ticles (for example, L ife magazine), would be greater than the right to
make similar copies of newer works, such as the new Eminem CD or
the latest episode of Friends.332
327. See, e.g., Audio Home Recording Act, 17 U.S.C.
tain personal copies of musical works).

§§ 1001-10 (2000) (privileging cer

328. Note there is disagreement over the validity of this type of "consumptive" fair use.

See Jane Ginsburg, Copyright Use and Excuse on the Internet, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS
1 (2000).

329. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
330. That is, assuming the Supreme Court does not see fit to revisit the issue. Note that
this is not an objection to the proposal in general, since time in this respect is no different
from the other fair use factors, which might or might not figure heavily in the fair use analy
sis, depending on the specific facts of the case.
331 . 464 U.S. at 421.
332. This argument assumes these works are not copy-protected. If they are, there may
be a limit on the ability of the individual to exercise his or her fair use rights. This limit
would be both technological, in the form of the copy-protection, and legal, since circum
venting the copy protection would give rise to a violation of the Digital Millennium Copy
right Act ("DMCA"), 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-05 (2000). The DMCA would be violated even if
the individual had a fair use privilege to copy the protected work, since the DMCA, unlike
the Copyright Act more generally, contains no general fair use exception. See Universal Stu
dios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 1 1 1 F. Supp. 2d 294, 321-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), affd, 273 F.3d 429 (2d
Cir. 2001 ).
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Again, this would be justified by the fact that the ex ante impact of
such copying. on incentives would be much less for the older work. In
addition, the older work is more likely to be a work of historical or
cultural interest, such that we would want to encourage wide dissemi
nation. Finally, the costs of. securing licenses for small-scale personal
copying would be expected to increase for older works, and indeed
might be prohibitively expensive for works that are no longer actively
distributed. This last consideration is particularly important given that
the costs of seeking permission to engage in personal copying could,
for older works, easily exceed the value of the use.333 Conversely, these
interests have comparatively less relevance for newer copyrighted
works. Time would again serve as a proxy for these interests and per
mit tailoring of copyright scope over time for personal copying.
Consideration of time also has the unexpected benefit of shedding
some interesting light on a long-standing puzzle involving the intersec
tion of personal copying and new technology. The case American
Geophysical Union v. Texaco334 nicely illustrates this puzzle.335 In that
case, a number of scientific journal publishers brought suit against
Texaco for its practice of systematically circulating these journals
among its research scientists and permitting them to make photocop
ies of articles for their files. The court in American Geophysical re
jected a fair use defense.336 In so doing, the court pointed to the avail
ability of licenses offered by the Copyright Clearance Center, a rights
management organization.337
American Geophysical points to a puzzle within the influential
market failure justification for fair use. As described above, under this
justification, fair use should generally be permitted in cases where the
cost of securing a license exceeds the value of the use.338 Under such
circumstances, fair use is an appropriate response to market failure
caused by the existence of transaction costs. However, this justification
is complicated by the potential emergence of private rights-clearance
organizations that could reduce the costs of licensing. Examples of

333.

See Gordon, supra note 243.

334.

60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).

335. Other examples of this issue include William & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487
F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1 973), affd by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (similar
photocopying case, though reaching different result), and the copy shop cases, see, e.g.,
Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Services, Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (en
bane), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1 156 (1997); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics, 758 F. Supp.
1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). See generally Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights
and Contract in the "Newtonian" World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1 15, 131-32 (1997) (discussing the cases).
336.

60 F.3d at 918-32.

337.

Id. at 929-31.

338.

See 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 10.1.1; Gordon, supra note 243.
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such organizations include BMP39 and ASCAP340 for music licensing
and the Copyright Clearance Center for journal copies. These organi
zations reduce the costs of licensing by providing blanket licenses that
permit certain uses of works and by monitoring these uses for compli
ance with the terms of the licensing agreements.341 Where such organi
zations exist, as in American Geophysical, the market-failure justifica
tion for fair use may be undercut since licenses are easily available.
The puzzle arises when courts are forced to deal with fair uses in
volving new copying technologies. For example, in Sony Corp. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc. ,342 the Supreme Court had to decide
whether private taping of television broadcasts for later. viewing con
stituted fair use. Under the market failure view, such taping would be
strongly supported given that the cost of an individual securing a li
cense to engage in such use exceeded the value of that use. However,
since the decision was handed down only shortly after the VCR was
introduced to the market, no organizations had yet arisen to issue such
licenses. The decision in Sony thus effectively prevented any such or
ganizations from ever arising.343 At the same time, it is quite possible
that such organizations would never have arisen, given the economics
particular to that market. Thus, a court presented with a fair use issue
involving new technology is forced at the outset to make a prediction
based on inadequate information that might have substantial effects
on the structure of an emerging market.344
One response to this puzzle is that courts should err on the side of
rejecting claims of fair use, since this gives private licensing institutions
a chance to develop.345 Since a decision permitting fair use will neces
sarily prevent the creation of · private institutions, courts should be
wary of making such a determination without more evidence that
there exist structural barriers to the creation of such institutions.346
This suggestion, however, is still less-than-optimal, because there may

339. Broadcast Music, Inc.
340. The American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers.
341. See Robert Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights
and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996).
342. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
343. See Merges, supra note 335, at 131; cf 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 10.1.1, at 10:7.
344. See Richard P. Adelstein & Steven I. Peretz, The Competition of Technologies in
Markets for Ideas: Copyright and Fair Use in Evolutionary Perspective, 5 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 209, 210-17 (1985). An analogous (though inverse) situation is raised by predictions

that the Internet will greatly reduce transaction costs associated with licensing uses through
micro-payments. See Bell, supra note 114; Mark Stefik, Shifting the Possible: How Trusted

Systems and Digital Property Rights Challenge Us to Rethink Digital Publishing, 12
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 137 (1997).
345. See Merges, supra note 335, at 131.
346. See id.
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be a cost associated with foregone uses if such institutions do not in
fact develop. Individuals will be barred from exercising certain fair
uses, and no low-cost licensing mechanisms will permit them to obtain
access. Moreover, technology and market responses are notoriously
difficult to predict,347 and courts are often not in the best position to
accurately assess the potential for such institutions to develop.
A more satisfactory answer is provided by consideration of time in
fair use analysis. By considering time, a court could adjust its finding
of fair use depending on when the issue was presented to it. Thus, if a
technology is entirely new and it is possible that private licensing
schemes might develop, a court could find no fair use in order to give
institutions the chance to develop such schemes.348 By contrast, if a
technology has been in place for a long time and no such institutions
or licensing schemes have developed, then a court should be more
willing to consider a fair use argument, since the failure of such institu
tions to develop would be evidence that the market will not solve the
transactions cost problem on its owh.349 Thus, consideration of time
would permit courts to get out of the bind that they are in when faced
with fair use claims involving new technologies. Note that in this case,
time is being considered, not with respect to the underlying copy
righted works, but rather with respect to the technology. By opening
up fair use analysis and making it sensitive to the relevance and impact
of time, the proposal would provide this additional benefit.350
4.

Reverse Engineering

In discussing examples of cases where the proposal in this Article
could be usefully applied, it is important also to recognize cases where
the application of the proposal would not be appropriate. One such
category of cases involves reverse engineering of computer software,
347. Jack Valenti, the chief executive of the Motion Picture Association of America,
famously testified before Congress in 1 982 that "the VCR is to the American film producer
and the American public as the Boston strangler is to the woman home alone." Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the Comm. on
the Judiciary on H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705, 97th
Cong. 8 (1982).
348. Note that this result is based purely on the market failure view of fair use. The
public benefit view of fair use might still support a finding of fair use under certain such cir
cumstances. See Merges, supra note 335, at 131.
349. See Matthew Africa, The Misuse of Licensing Evidence in Fair Use Analysis: New
Technologies, New Markets, and the Courts, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1 145, 1 183 (2000) (considering

but rejecting such a proposal because of lack of a doctrinal method of implementation);
Merges, supra note 335, at 131 (making just thls proposal).

350. The discussion above is intended primarily to highlight one possible additional
benefit of considering time as a factor in fair use analysis. The broader and complex issue of
how copyright law more generally should respond to changes in copying technology is be
yond the scope of this Article. Further study of how this proposal might affect this broader
issue is warranted.
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and it is sufficiently important to warrant at least a brief express men
tion here. Computer software is protected by copyright law as a liter
ary work.351 However, copyright law has not been an easy fit for soft
ware,352 since software contains functional elements which copyright
law is not designed to protect. Thus courts have had to adapt existing
copyright doctrines to the peculiarities of computer software, permit
ting them to protect the creative elements while preventing them from
unintentionally protecting the functional aspects of software and
thereby reducing competition and innovation.
One way courts have done this is through the fair use doctrine. In
particular, the courts have established a fair use privilege to copy
software for purposes of reverse engineering in order to make com
patible products.353 Thus, for example, a video game manufacturer is
permitted to make copies of a console manufacturer's operating sys
tem software in order to study it and make compatible games.354 Simi
larly, under certain circumstances, an applications developer should be
permitted to reverse engineer an operating system in order to develop
a compatible program. This privilege is considered necessary to pre
vent copyright owners from using copyright law to hinder desirable
competition.
The proposal in this Article should not be read to support an ar
gument that reverse engineering should be greater for older works and
more limited for new works. This is because the justifications sup
porting the proposal simply do not apply to the unique circumstances
of computer software. First, the current copyright term vastly exceeds
the useful life of computer software. Whatever may be said about the
appropriateness of a life-plus-seventy term for copyrighted works in
general, it is impossible not to recognize that such a term is far too
long for computer software, which rarely has a useful life beyond ten
years. Thus, to the extent that many of the justifications supporting the
proposal rely on changes that occur over the decades of the copyright
351. 17 U.S.C. § 101
1246-49 (3d Cir. 1983).

(2000); Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer, 714 F.2d 1240,

352. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'), 49 F.3d 807, 820 (1st Cir. 1995) (Boudin, J.,
concurring) ("Applying copyright law to computer programs is like assembling a jigsaw puz
zle whose pieces do not quite fit."); Computer Assocs. lnt'I v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693, 712 (2d
Cir. 1992) ("Generally, we think that copyright registration - with its indiscriminating
availability - is not ideally suited to deal with the highly dynamic technology of computer
science.").
353. See Sega Enters. v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1993); see also DSC Commu
nications Corp. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 1996); Atari Games Corp. v.
Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software
Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 270 (5th Cir. 1988). See generally Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and

the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual Property Implications of "Lock-Out" Tech
nologies, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1091 (1995); Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The
Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 1 1 1 YALE L.J. 1575 (2002).
354.

See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1520.
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term, these j ustifications are inapplicable to the much shorter life of
computer software.355
Second, many of the justifications for the proposal are based on
the expressive and creative nature of copyrighted works. That is, the
justifications based on the desire for transformation, re-use, and re
imagining of copyrighted works are peculiar to expressive works that
communicate meaning to an audience. By contrast, computer software
is expressive in only the most limited sense. Its primary value is not in
the creative expression embodied in the program code, since the code
itself does · not communicate directly to the audience. Rather the pri
mary value is found in the functional aspects of the program.356 Thus,
to the extent that computer software does not involve these expressive
considerations, the corresponding justifications simply do not apply.
Third, and more specific to reverse engineering, limiting fair use in
the initial years of a software program's term of protection could visit
real harm on competitive markets for computer software. The fair use
privilege for reverse engineering is necessary to prevent software pub
lishers from using copyright to prevent competition in software mar
kets.357 This competition is particularly important early in the life-cycle
of computer software, partly because the life-cycle is so short, and
partly because software markets are characterized by strong network
effects.358 That is, software programs and platforms can become more
valuable when used by more users since this enables users to easily
transfer learned skills, permits them to easily share common document
formats, and encourages development of valuable compatible pro
grams.359 Because this state of affairs makes it possible for certain pro
grams to become dominant, encouraging compatibility and competi
tion is particularly important early in the lifecycle of these software
markets, in order to foster real competition.360

355. See LESSIG, supra note 121, at 252 ("Software is a special case. The current (term
of] protection for software . . . is a parody of the Constitution's requirement that copyright
be for 'limited Times.' . . . The term of copyright for software is effectively unlimited.'').
356. See Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of
Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994).
357. See Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Applica
tion Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045 (1989).
358. See, e.g., Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, an4
Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1985). See generally Mark A. Lemley & David
McGowan, Legal Implications ofNetwork Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998).
359. See Joseph Farrell, Standardization and Intellectual Property, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 35
(1989); Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, 16
RAND J. ECON. 70 (1985); Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization
Problem, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1041 (19%). But see S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The
Fable ofthe Keys, 33 J.L. ECON. 1 (1990).
360. See Menell, supra note 357. But see Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considera
tions in the Intellectual Property Protection of Software, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 346 (1995).
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Thus, for the above reasons, the proposal in this Article is not ap
plicable to cases involving reverse engineering of computer .software,
largely because of the unique aspects of copyright protection of com
puter software. Although the proposal in this Article would have sub
stantial benefits when 11pplied to the vast majority of copyrightable
works, it is important to acknowledge this one specific limitation on
the scope of the proposal.
B.

Objections

A number of objections could (and will likely) be raised against
the proposal in this Article. One objection is that considering time as a
factor in fair use analysis will only serve to make copyright entitle
ments more uncertain. As a general matter, we prefer to have clear
entitlements, since clarity reduces both the potential for, and the cost
of, disputes.361 If entitlements are clear, parties will know what their
rights are and thereby avoid infringement. And in the cases of in
fringement that do occur, courts will be able to resolve the issue more
expeditiously if a clear ·rule exists. Moreover, clarity facilitates effi
ciency by lowering the costs of bargaining. Thus, one practical objec
tion is that adding time to the mix merely muddies the water.
As an initial matter, consideration of time would in fact add little
·appreciable uncertainty beyond the levels that already exist in copy
right law more generally. The fair use defense is notoriously uncertain
in scope, since it already involves the case-by-case balancing of four
statutory factors.362 Moreover, the Copyright Act itself expressly con
templates the consideration of additional, unspecified fair use fac
tors.363 The defense is already quite uncertain in scope, and the consid
eration of an additional factor would add little marginal uncertainty.
Indeed, the uncertainty is the cost associated with the great benefit of
fair use analysis, its flexibility. And in giving courts a broad degree of
discretion, Congress clearly made a policy choice in favor of flexibility,
despite its costs.
In addition, the actual application of time as a factor would be
relatively straightforward.364 Unlike many of the other factors, the con
tent of this new factor would be absolutely clear. That is, the age of a
·

..

361. See MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (2d ed.
1989); Cooter & Ulen, supra note 136; Merges, supra note 341; Carol M. Rose, Crystals and
Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988). But see Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for
Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121 (1999).
362. Indeed, the fair use defense has famously been called "the most troublesome [is
sue] in the whole law of copyright." Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661 , 662 (2d
Cir. 1939).
363.

See supra Section III.A.

364.

See Hughes, Fair Use, supra note 10 (making same arguments).
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work is a fact that can be objectively determined, artd that will rarely
be the subject of dispute. The date Gone With the Wind was published
is an established fact, easily discoverable and verifiable. This is not the
case with all of the other fair use factors. For example, the impact on
the market - arguably the most important factor - is notoriously dif
ficult to quantify and subject to significant uncertainty,' particularly
when dealing with markets for derivative works. Thus, the new factor
has an advantage in that respect.
Moreover, even the weight of this factor is relatively straightfor
ward, insofar as it is a fairly simple sliding scale. The older the work,
th� greater the scope of fair use. The consideration is essentially a bi
nary one. Although it proceeds along a continuum, from recent to old,
from more protection to less, this is no different than any of the other
factors. For example, works can be anywhere on the continuum be
tween factual and creative, commercial or nonco,nmercial, transfor
mative or non-transformative. Similarly the amount of the original ap
propriated can vary from little to much, or anywhere in between. And
at least in the instance of time, the factual predicate (that is, the num
ber of years) is unambiguous. Thus, the application of the factor itself
would not add much if any additional uncertainty.
Finally, to the extent that consideration of this factor tips the scales
in many cases, as in the Wind Done Gone case, it may in fact provide a
clearer and simpler way of determining the scope of protection. That
is, for older works, consideration of time might well make it easier for
courts to reach their ultimate decision. True, in other cases considera
tion of time might make what would otherwise be a clear case a closer
case. The point, however, is that we cannot be sure ahead of time
whether it would increase or decrease uncertainty. Thus, there is no
indication that consideration of time would make fair use analysis
more complex or indeterminate, particularly given that it is already extremely indeterminate.365
A second objection is that considering time is inappropriate be
cause time acts as a proxy for other values, and these other values
should be considered expressly: If time serves as a proxy for incen
tives, a court should look directly at incentives. Or if time serves as a
·

365. A related objection is that the proposal fosters a particular kind of uncertainty by
making questions of fair use subject to reexamination, thus undermining a general interest in
repose. That is, a defendant who lost a case could simply wait a number of years, then get a
second bite at the apple. While it is true that cases might be open to reexamination after a
number of years, the practical impact of this will likely be quite minimal. First, cases would
only be open to examination after an appreciable number of years have passed, since the
policy interests vindicated by the proposal are affected by passage of time measured in dec
ades, not single years. Thus there is really little risk of fair use issues being re-litigated every
few years. Second, to the extent that cases are re-litigated not years but decades later, this is
a desirable feature of the proposal, not a drawback. That is, by permitting reexamination
after many years have passed, the proposal serves the policy interests that have been offered
in support of the proposal, since by then, the balance of such interests may well have shifted.
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proxy for increased transactions costs, we should determine the scope
of such costs directly, as courts sometimes already do. Or if time
serves as a proxy for the cultural significance of a work, a court should
look directly at that significance. Or if time serves as a proxy for the
reward to authors, we should look directly at whether the reward is
sufficient.366 By considering time independently, a court risks applying
the factor in cases where it may not accurately reflect the true interest
that we are seeking to vindicate.
My response is that time is useful precisely because it serves as a
proxy for all of the above considerations. Direct consideration of the
interests above would in fact lead to much added complexity in fair
use analysis, since assessment of the multiple factors above would be
difficult and highly indeterminate.367 Whether an author deserves
more compensation is not something that can easily be answered with
any degree of precision.368 Similarly, the cultural significance of a
work, although perhaps easier to determine, is fraught with the type of
subjective cultural value judgments that courts in copyright cases pre
fer to avoid.369 As I hope to have established above, however, time
serves as a very good proxy for compensation to the author, for incen
tives, for the costs of access, for the cultural significance of the work,
and for other important policy justifications underlying copyright law
generally. And it obviates the need to consider all of them at the same
time.
The proposal thus strikes a pragmatic balance by permitting con
sideration of all of these interests without adding an unworkable
amount of additional complexity. The challenge in proposing a doc
trinal change, particularly to an area as confusing and indeterminate as
fair use, is coming up with one that adds significant benefits without
introducing too much in the way of costs, including costs associated
with administrability. The proposal in this Article is already open to
the criticism that it is making an already indeterminate issue even
more indeterminate. As I have indicated above, I do not believe this
to be the case. But it certainly would be the case if, instead of simply
366. See, e.g., Note, supra note 10, at 1210-15 (proposing that courts expressly consider
the amount of compensation that the author has received).
367. See, e.g., Note, supra note 10, at 1215 (proposing express consideration of whether
a work has achieved "iconic" status, although acknowledging that this determination may be
difficult).
368. Indeed, our copyright system is designed in many ways so that we can avoid ad
dressing this question. Under our system, the "value" of a work is measured by the market,
see Netanel, supra note 107, which may or may not correspond to social value, cultural
importance, or desert to the author. See BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION,
supra note 4, at 144 {"In any case, copyright as a general matter is a poor vehicle for insuring
'due rewards.' Economic success and cultural value do not perforce coincide . . . . Nor is
there any necessary correlation between this return and the moral deserts of the creator.").
369. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing, 188 U.S. 239 (1903). But see Alfred Yen,
Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247 (1998).
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considering time as an additional factor, courts were instead asked to
consider questions such as the cultural significance of a work or the
appropriate amount of compensation deserved by an author. By using
time as a proxy, the proposal permits consideration of many of the
complicated underlying policy concerns in the context of a relatively
easy-to-administer additional factor in fair use analysis.370
Of course, time is not a perfect proxy for these underlying inter
ests. For example, one could imagine a case where a painter toiled
away in obscurity for much of his life, only to achieve fame well after
his death in the last ten years of the copyright term. Under such cir
cumstances, time is not an accurate measure of desert or of compensa
tion.371 Similarly, many old works may have little or no cultural signifi
cance, and thus not be desirable subjects for transformation or re
imagination. Or take the question of transaction costs. Although in
many cases, the age of a work may be correlated with costs associated
with securing licenses, in other cases there may be no such correlation,
for example where a work is still being actively licensed near the end
of its copyright term. Thus there may well be cases where time does
not perfectly reflect the underlying copyright interests.
Time will be a good proxy in many cases, however, and the bene
fits of considering time as an easy-to-administer mechanism for getting
at these underlying interests is sufficient to justify its application as a
general rule (though always subject to modification if exceptional cir
cumstances arise). Indeed, many of the existing fair use factors are
themselves proxies for underlying copyright interests. For example,
the nature of the work, the amount copied, and the nature of the use
are not themselves relevant copyright values. Instead, they serve as
proxies for underlying values such as the potential harm to incentives,
the societal benefits from the use, etc. Thus, even with the standard
fair use factors, there may be situations where a given factor does not
adequately serve as a proxy for underlying copyright values.372 Indeed,
even the copyright term is a proxy, since it is always possible that a
work may become commercially famous after the term of protection
has expired. Despite these possibilities, we do not dismiss these con
siderations since, by and large, they do a good job of approximating
the values that we are concerned with. Such is the case with time.
370. See BARD & KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION, supra note 4, at 52 n.70
(noting that varying term work-by-work, though perhaps theoretically optimal, would be
administratively impossible, and suggesting fair use as an alternative measure of tailoring
protection).
371. Of course, the compensation in this example would go to the author's heirs, since
he or she would be long dead by this time.
372. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (dismissing the
"nature of the work" factor and substantially qualifying the "amount copied" factor to adapt
it to the case of parody); Sega Enters. v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1993) (creatively
interpreting the "amount copied," "commercial use," and "harm to market" factors to fit the
peculiarities of reverse engineering).
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A third objection is that the proposal in this Article is too vague
and ill-defined to have an appreciable impact on the scope of fair
use.373 Under this view, time will not contribute measurably to fair use
analysis (beyond the extent to which it may or may not already be
taken into account in the other factors) or make a difference in
enough cases to make it worthwhile for courts to even engage in the
analysis. As I hope I have shown above, however, the added cost of
considering time is quite minimal, since the test for time is rather easy
to administer. Moreover, as the examples above point out, considera
tion of time could in fact lead to different results in an appreciable
number of cases.
True, the impact of time would be felt incrementally as courts ap
ply the rule in a case-by-case fashion. The impact of this change would
not be as dramatic as the invalidation of term extension, which would
immediately affect a huge number of works, casting them clearly into
the public domain. Instead, the impact of the proposal would develop
over time, as parties adopt the argument in their briefs, as individual
courts (hopefully) accept the argument, as third parties read and in
ternalize the resulting decisions, and as these third parties change their
behavior in response to the change in the law. However, in many ways,
this is a strength of the proposal, since it permits courts to inject such
considerations in a case-by-case fashion, to which courts are more ac
customed. It permits courts to work out the implications of this change
and to refine it as they apply it to specific cases. And over the long
term, the impact of the change would be substantial, insofar as it
would become clear that older works are subject to a greater scope of
fair use.
I expect that owners of valuable long-standing copyrights will have
strong objections to the proposal in this Article. It's not hard to see
why. The Disney corporation, for example, derives a tremendous
amount of revenue from its copyrights in Mickey Mouse, Minnie
Mouse, Donald Duck, Goofy, and the rest. The analysis in this Article
suggests that Mickey should be subject to greater scope of fair use. Al
though Disney might be upset at this prospect, the general public
should be delighted. Mickey has already received more than seventy
years of exclusive copyright protection and, on top of that, a twenty
year reprieve under the copyright term extension act. Walt Disney and
his descendants have been amply rewarded for Mr. Disney's original
creative labor.374 No authors witnessing a slightly greater scope of fair
373. Fair use can be an easy out for those who would like to see changes in the scope of
copyright protection, insofar as it leaves to the courts the task of implementing proposed
changes through exercise of their discretion, and does not require too much uncomfortable
specificity in detailing such changes. In this case, however, the proposal is an extremely con
crete one and would modify fair use analysis in a discrete and particular way.
374. See Litman, supra note 304, at 431-32.
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use of Mickey Mouse would be deterred from creative labor by the
prospect of reduced incentives. The Disney corporation has had ample
time to exploit and build upon the original cultural property. And now
it's time for others to have a crack at Mickey.
CONCLUSION

This Article has argued that courts should consider time when de
ciding whether a use is fair. The copyright act itself expressly permits
courts to consider additional factors in fair use, and extremely strong
policy justifications support such a consideration. By considering time
as a factor in fair use analysis, courts can achieve a more finely-tuned
balance of the various justifications underlying copyright law more
generally, one that recognizes the impact of time on the proper scope
of copyright protection.

